_March 16th._--Cowley called on me yesterday at the Council Office. He said that he had never believed there would be war, and he did not expect it now; that all the agitation and turmoil that had been vexing Europe for the last three months were to be attributed to the conduct of Cavour and his attempts to drag France into assisting Piedmont in her aggressive policy, and to misunderstandings which had been produced by the strange conduct of the French Government, the imprudent speech of the Emperor to Hübner on January 1st, and the ambiguous manifestations which had followed it. To comprehend all these things it was necessary to be acquainted with the whole course of Cavour's policy and his dealings with France, and to understand the peculiar character of the Emperor and the motives and impulses by which he is actuated. When Austria refused to join England and France in the Russian War, Cavour thought that an opportunity presented itself of which he might take advantage, and which would lead to a realisation of his views for the aggrandisement of Piedmont, and he offered to join the alliance and send an army to the Crimea. This offer (as Cowley thinks very imprudently and unfortunately) was accepted. He thinks it was unwise, because the assistance of Piedmont was not required, and could not have any material effect on the result of the contest, while it was sure to excite hopes and expectations, and to give rise to demands which would be afterwards found very inconvenient and embarrassing. Accordingly Cavour took the earliest opportunity of expressing his hopes that when peace should return Sardinia and her services would not be overlooked. General expressions of goodwill were given, but Cowley cannot answer for what more the Emperor may have said. [Sidenote: LORD COWLEY'S VIENNA NEGOTIATION.]