The Group Mind: A Sketch of the Principles of Collective Psychology: With Some Attempt to Apply Them to the Interpretation of National Life and CharacterMcDougall, William
Science
The Group Mind: A Sketch of the Principles of Collective Psychology: With Some Attempt to Apply Them to the Interpretation of National Life and Character
McDougall, William
Ethnopsychology; National characteristics; Social psychology
Dr Bosanquet[85], criticising Rousseau’s doctrine, says that the general
will is expressed by the working of the institutions of the community
which embody its dominant ideas; that no one man really grasps the
nature and relations of the whole society and its tendencies; that the
general will is thus unconscious (by which he seems to mean that the
nation is unconscious of itself and of its ends or purposes); and he
goes on to say that the general will is the product of practical
activities making for nearer smaller ends, and that its harmony depends
on the fact that the activities of each individual are parts of a
systematic whole.
Bosanquet’s theory amounts to a justification of the old individualist
_laissez faire_ doctrine—the doctrine that the good of the whole is best
achieved by giving freest possible scope to the play and conflict of
individual purposes and strivings—the philosophic radicalism of Bentham
and Mill, which teaches that, if each man honestly and efficiently
pursues his private ends, the welfare of the State somehow results. How
this systematic whole which is the State arises he does not explain; and
it seems to me that Bosanquet leaves unsolved that difficulty which, as
we saw, led Schiller and others to postulate an external power guiding
each people—the difficulty, if we assume that individual wills strive
only after private egoistic ends, of explaining how the good of the
whole is nevertheless achieved.
In all societies many general changes result, and in some nations no
doubt the good of the whole is achieved in a measure by fortunate
accident, in the way Bosanquet describes—namely, by the interplay of
individual wills working for near individual ends. But, I think, it is
improper to say that in such a case any general will exists. Such a
nation, if it displays any collective activity, only does so in an
impulsive blind way which is not true volition, but is comparable rather
with instinctive action; for, as we have seen, self-consciousness is
essential to volition; a truly volitional action is one which issues
from the contemplation of some end represented in relation to the idea
of the self and found to be desirable. And the changes of a society
which result in the way Bosanquet claims as the expression of the
general will are unforeseen and unwilled; they are no more the
expression and effects of a general will than are the movements of a
billiard ball struck simultaneously by two or more men each of whom aims
at a different position.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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