The Group Mind: A Sketch of the Principles of Collective Psychology: With Some Attempt to Apply Them to the Interpretation of National Life and CharacterMcDougall, William
Science
The Group Mind: A Sketch of the Principles of Collective Psychology: With Some Attempt to Apply Them to the Interpretation of National Life and Character
McDougall, William
Ethnopsychology; National characteristics; Social psychology
And, as the organisation of a nation becomes less dependent upon outer
authority and upon mere custom and the unreasoning acceptance of
tradition, and more and more upon free consent and voluntary contract,
the nation does not cease to be an organism; it retains that formal and
informal organisation which has developed in large part without the
deliberate guidance of the collective will and which is essential to its
collective life; the national mind, as it grows in force and extension
and understanding of its own organisation, accepts those features which
it finds good, and gradually modifies those which appear less good in
the light of its increasing self knowledge; and so it tends more and
more to become a contractual organism, which, as Fouillée has insisted,
is the highest type of society.
It should be noticed that this ideal of the contractual organism
synthesises the two great doctrines or theories of society which have
generally been regarded as irreconcilable alternatives: the doctrine of
society as an organism, and that of society as founded upon reason and
free will. They have been treated as opposed and irreconcilable
doctrines, because those who regarded society as an organism, taking
the standpoint of natural science, have laid stress upon its evolution
by biological accidents and by the interaction and conflict of many
blind impulses and purely individual volitions, in which collective
volition, governed by an ideal of the form to be achieved, had no part.
While, on the other hand, the idealist philosophers, describing society
or the nation as wholly the work of reason and free will, have been
guilty of the intellectualist fallacy of regarding man as a purely
rational being; they have ignored the fact that all men, even the most
intellectual, are largely swayed and moulded by processes of suggestion,
imitation, sympathy, and instinctive impulse, in quite non-rational
ways; and they have ignored still more completely the fact that the
operation of these non-rational processes continues to be not only of
immense influence but also inevitable and necessary to the maintenance
of that organic unity of society upon which as a basis the
contract-unity is superimposed as a bond of a higher, more rational and
more spiritual quality.
The former doctrine logically tends to the paralysis of social effort
and to the adoption of extreme individualism, to the doctrine of each
man for himself, and of _laissez faire_, doctrines such as those of
Herbert Spencer. The other, the idealist theory of the state as being
founded and formed by reason, tends equally logically towards extreme
State socialism; because its overweening belief in reason leads it to
ignore the large and necessary basis of subrational organisation and
operation.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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