The Group Mind: A Sketch of the Principles of Collective Psychology: With Some Attempt to Apply Them to the Interpretation of National Life and CharacterMcDougall, William
Science
The Group Mind: A Sketch of the Principles of Collective Psychology: With Some Attempt to Apply Them to the Interpretation of National Life and Character
McDougall, William
Ethnopsychology; National characteristics; Social psychology
The fact of the superiority of public opinion is generally admitted and
various explanations are current, for the most part very vague and
incomplete. There is the mystical explanation embodied in the dictum
that the voice of the people is the voice of God. A rather less vague
explanation is that adopted by Mr Beattie Crozier[101] (among others).
It is said that the average man carries within him a germ of an ideal
of justice and right, and that he applies this to the criticism or
approval of the actions of other men; though he often fails to apply it
to his own actions, because, where his own interests are concerned, he
is apt to be the sport of purely egoistic impulses.
But this explanation is only partially true. It represents the average
man as more hypocritical than he really is, and as falling farther below
the standards he acknowledges than he actually does fall. It leaves
unexplained the fact that he has this sentiment for an ideal of justice
and right; and it proceeds on a false assumption as to the nature of the
problem, in assuming that men judge the actions of other men by higher
standards than those which they apply to their own conduct; whereas this
is by no means generally true.
Is it, then, that superior abilities, which enable a man to gain
prestige and to impress his ideas and sentiments upon his fellow men and
so to influence public opinion, are commonly combined with a natural
superiority of moral sentiment, with a love of right and a hatred of
injustice? There may be some degree of such natural correlation of
superior abilities with superior moral qualities, but the supposition
seems very doubtful; and certainly, if it exists, it is not sufficient
to account for the elevation of public opinion. We frequently see
consummate ability combined with most questionable moral sentiments, as
in Napoleon and many other historic personages.
The true explanation is, I submit, to be found in the basal fact that
the moral sentiments are essentially altruistic, while the immoral and
non-moral sentiments are in the main self-regarding[102]. Hence, the
person who has great abilities but is lacking in moral sentiments and
altruism applies his abilities to secure his personal satisfactions and
aggrandisement; and, in so far as he aims at affecting the minds of
others, he tries only to secure their obedience to his commands and
suggestions, to inspire them with deference, admiration, fear and awe,
and to evoke an outward display of these feelings. But, as to the ideas
and sentiments of the people in general, save in so far as they affect
his own gratification, he cares nothing. Accordingly we never find great
abilities deliberately, consistently and directly applied to the
degradation of public opinion and morals, save occasionally in relation
to some particular end. And we find few or no great works of literature
and art deliberately aiming at such degradation.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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