Jewish philosophy -- Early works to 1800; Judaism -- Works to 1900; Philosophy, Medieval -- Early works to 1800
pepper there is no relation, the one being a quality, the other a
quantity; or between wisdom and sweetness, between meekness and
bitterness, although all these come under the head of quality in its
more general signification. How, then, could there be any relation
between God and His creatures, considering the important difference
between them in respect to true existence, the greatest of all
differences. Besides, if any relation existed between them, God would
be subject to the accident of relation; and although that would not be
an accident to the essence of God, it would still be, to some extent, a
kind of accident. You would, therefore, be wrong if you applied
affirmative attributes in their literal sense to God, though they
contained only relations; these, however, are the most appropriate of
all attributes, to be employed, in a less strict sense, in reference to
God, because they do not imply that a plurality of eternal things
exists, or that any change takes place in the essence of God, when
those things change to which God is in relation.
Fifthly. A thing is described by its actions; I do not mean by “its
actions” the inherent capacity for a certain work, as is expressed in
“carpenter,” “painter,” or “smith”—for these belong to the class of
qualities which have been mentioned above—but I mean the action the
latter has performed—we speak, e.g., of Zaid, who made this door, built
that wall, wove that garment. This kind of attributes is separate from
the essences of the thing described, and, therefore, appropriate to be
employed in describing the Creator, especially since we know that these
different actions do not imply that different elements must be
contained in the substance of the agent, by which the different actions
are produced, as will be explained. On the contrary, all the actions of
God emanate from His essence, not from any extraneous thing superadded
to His essence, as we have shown.
What we have explained in the present chapter is this: that God is one
in every respect, containing no plurality or any element superadded to
His essence: and that the many attributes of different significations
applied in Scripture to God, originate in the multitude of His actions,
not in a plurality existing in His essence, and are partly employed
with the object of conveying to us some notion of His perfection, in
accordance with what we consider perfection, as has been explained by
us. The possibility of one simple substance excluding plurality, though
accomplishing different actions, will be illustrated by examples in the
next chapter.
CHAPTER LIII
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