Jewish philosophy -- Early works to 1800; Judaism -- Works to 1900; Philosophy, Medieval -- Early works to 1800
his grandson, and his great-grandson, that is, the fourth generation.
By the mention of this attribute we are, as it were, told that His
commandments, undoubtedly in harmony with His acts, include the death
even of the little children of idolaters because of the sin of their
fathers and grandfathers. This principle we find frequently applied in
the Law, as, e.g., we read concerning the city that has been led astray
to idolatry, “destroy it utterly, and all that is therein” (Deut. xiii.
15). All this has been ordained in order that every vestige of that
which would lead to great injury should be blotted out, as we have
explained.
We have gone too far away from the subject of this chapter, but we have
shown why it has been considered sufficient to mention only these
(thirteen) out of all His acts; namely, because they are required for
the good government of a country; for the chief aim of man should be to
make himself, as far as possible, similar to God: that is to say, to
make his acts similar to the acts of God, or as our Sages expressed it
in explaining the verse, “Ye shall be holy” (Lev. xxi. 2): “He is
gracious, so be you also gracious; He is merciful, so be you also
merciful.”
The principal object of this chapter was to show that all attributes
ascribed to God are attributes of His acts, and do not imply that God
has any qualities.
CHAPTER LV
We have already, on several occasions, shown in this treatise that
everything that implies corporeality or passiveness, is to be negatived
in reference to God, for all passiveness implies change; and the agent
producing that state is undoubtedly different from the object affected
by it; and if God could be affected in any way whatever, another being
beside Him would act on Him and cause change in Him. All kinds of
non-existence must likewise be negatived in reference to Him; no
perfection whatever can therefore be imagined to be at one time absent
from Him, and at another present in Him: for if this were the case, He
would [at a certain time] only be potentially perfect. Potentiality
always implies non-existence, and when anything has to pass from
potentiality into reality, another thing that exists in reality is
required to effect that transition. Hence it follows that all
perfections must really exist in God, and none of them must in any way
be a mere potentiality. Another thing likewise to be denied in
reference to God, is similarity to any existing being. This has been
generally accepted, and is also mentioned in the books of the Prophets;
e.g., “To whom, then, will you liken me?” (Isa. xl. 25); “To whom,
then, will you liken God?” (ib. 18); “There is none like unto Thee”
(Jer. x. 6). Instances of this kind are frequent. In short, it is
necessary to demonstrate by proof that nothing can be predicated of God
that implies any of the following four things: corporeality, emotion or
change, non-existence,—e.g., that something would be potential at one
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