Jewish philosophy -- Early works to 1800; Judaism -- Works to 1900; Philosophy, Medieval -- Early works to 1800
We have already stated above that the angels are incorporeal. This
agrees with the opinion of Aristotle: there is only this difference in
the names employed—he uses the term “Intelligences,” and we say instead
“angels.” His theory is that the Intelligences are intermediate beings
between the Prime Cause and existing things, and that they effect the
motion of the spheres, on which motion the existence of all things
depends. This is also the view we meet with in all parts of Scripture;
every act of God is described as being performed by angels. But “angel”
means “messenger”; hence every one that is intrusted with a certain
mission is an angel. Even the movements of the brute creation are
sometimes due to the action of an angel, when such movements serve the
purpose of the Creator, who endowed it with the power of performing
that movement; e.g., “God hath sent His angel, and hath shut the lions’
mouths that they have not hurt me” (Dan. vi. 22). Another instance may
be seen in the movements of Balaam’s ass, described as caused by an
angel. The elements are also called angels. Comp. “Who maketh winds His
angels, flaming fire His ministers” (Ps. civ. 4). There is no doubt
that the word “angel” is used of a messenger sent by man; e.g., “And
Jacob sent angels” (Gen. xxxii. 4); of a prophet, e.g., “And an angel
of the Lord came up from Gilgal to Bochim” (Judges ii. 1); “And He sent
an angel, and hath brought us forth out of Egypt” (Num. xx. 16). It is
also used of ideals, perceived by prophets in prophetic visions, and of
man’s animal powers, as will be explained in another place.
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