The heart of Asia : $b A history of Russian Turkestan and the Central Asian Khanates from the earliest timesSkrine, Francis Henry
History
The heart of Asia : $b A history of Russian Turkestan and the Central Asian Khanates from the earliest times
Skrine, Francis Henry
Asia, Central -- History; Asia, Central -- Relations -- Russia; Russia -- Relations -- Asia, Central
Petersburg, “we cannot avoid
regarding the abyss which opens before us with terror, for it may
well disorganise the economic and political condition of the empire.
The English[620] have succeeded in convincing Asiatics that they
have forced us to stop before Constantinople and abandon the Balkan
peninsula. Thanks to their agents’ zeal, a version of the Treaty of
Berlin, very disadvantageous to ourselves, has been spread throughout
Asia. Great God, what sacrifices of blood and honour will this peace,
so painful to Russian hearts, entail!” To this illustrious soldier the
Tsar turned in his perplexity. A better choice could not have been
made. Michael Dmitriavitch Skobeleff was, at this epoch, in the prime
of life,[621] and at the zenith of his preternatural activity. His
military career had begun at the age of twenty, and, two years later,
he won his spurs during the Polish Rebellion. Between 1871–1875 he
was in the thick of Central Asian affairs, one of the leaders against
Khiva, and the conqueror of Kokand. The Russo-Turkish War of 1877–1878
found employment for him nearer home. He commanded the left wing at
the storming of Plevna, and afterwards took Adrianople; but experience
and military genius are of small avail without that magnetic personal
attraction which is inborn only in the greatest leaders. Skobeleff
possessed this heaven-sent gift. “He was the God of War personified,”
said his trusted lieutenant, General Kurapatkine; and his troops loved
him with a passionate ardour which no general has inspired since the
days of Napoleon. A conference took place in January 1880 between the
Tsar Alexander II. and his brilliant subject, followed by others at
the Ministry of War presided over by General Miliutine. The ways and
means were fully discussed. It became clear that the failure of 1879
was due to defective transport. The camels on which General Lomakin
relied perished by thousands in the desert, and he found himself, at
a critical moment, without the means of continuing the siege of Geok
Teppe.[622] By one of those happy inspirations which flash on the brain
of men of genius, Skobeleff was led to invoke the aid of steam. He knew
that the desert was a dead level, without rivers to bridge, and that a
scarcity of water was the only difficulty before his engineers. Nay,
his eagle eye ranged far beyond the needs of the moment, and clearly
foresaw the advantages which would flow from a railway connecting
the Caspian and the Amū Daryā.[623] A special railway battalion was
formed, and materials for a portable line on the Decauville system were
brought to Uzun Ada, the base on the Gulf of Michaelovsk. Before the
close of 1880 the section between that post and Mullā Kārī, a distance
of thirteen miles, was completed. The control of the expedition was
vested in the commander-in-chief of the Caucasus, but a free hand was
practically given to Skobeleff, who was named “Temporary Commander of
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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