The United Nations plan would take effect by “stages”—one stage to include, among other projects, a world-wide geological survey, another stage, to involve, among other projects, the taking over of atomic installations, and still another to bring about the disposition of fissionable materials. At what point in some such progression would national stockpiles of deuterium and tritium be placed under control? When this point was reached, would they be destroyed or be held in storage under United Nations auspices? If a nation pretended to make known its entire stockpile of tritium and deuterium while actually it kept hidden a substantial portion, how would the international agency discover such a violation? AUTHORS COMMENT See comment on questions 12 and 13. 12. HOW DOES THE H-BOMB BEAR UPON THE PROBLEM OF DISPOSITION OF EXISTING STOCKS OF FISSIONABLE MATERIAL? When a control plan takes effect, what should be done with supplies of U-235 and plutonium in excess of a quantity immediately usable for peacetime purposes? This problem has received relatively little consideration in the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission. If excess stocks were destroyed, a valuable future source of energy and storehouse of neutrons would be lost. On the other hand, if the stocks were kept in existence under UN guard, seizure by an aggressor state might rapidly permit it to attack with atomic bombs—and innocent countries might have relatively little warning. Such seizures might quickly lead, under certain circumstances, to the construction of “triggers” for H-bombs. Does this fact tip the balance in favor of destroying excess U-235 and plutonium? Or are these substances still too valuable and too difficult to replace to justify destruction? Is there a third alternative—possibly involving partial destruction or the use of “denaturants” or the construction of many power reactors, regardless of cost factors—to keep excess stocks of fissionables contaminated with fission products? AUTHORS COMMENT