It is difficult to define the amount of activity in the illicit production of atomic weapons which is significant. The illicit construction of a single atomic bomb by means of a decade of successful evasion would not provide an overwhelming advantage, if it can be assumed that it would take another decade to produce a second bomb. But the secret production of one bomb per year would create a definite danger, and the secret production of five or more per year would be disastrous. This report assumes arbitrarily that the minimum unit of noncompliance is the secret production of one atomic bomb per year or a total of five bombs over any period of time. [This example is chosen because UN documents published later omit concrete illustrations, although the stress which these documents place upon international ownership, operation, and management clearly reflects a determination to reduce to the rock-bottom minimum any illicit mining or production.] Considering that five illicit A-bombs might, under certain circumstances, lead to five illicit H-bombs, what margin of inefficiency—if any—in controlling source and fissionable material is permissible? Is absolute protection against illegal diversion of source and fissionable material technically possible? Does the existing UN plan provide absolute or near-absolute protection? Can greater technical protection be secured than under the present UN plan? AUTHOR’S COMMENT It can be stated unequivocally that, in the absence of complete mutual faith and goodwill on the part of all concerned, neither the existing UN plan nor any other technical plan that can be devised will provide absolute or near-absolute protection. No plan could be devised that would provide assurance against the diversion of enough material in any one year to make at least one atomic bomb. In five years this would mean the secret production of five hydrogen bombs. 5. MUST H-BOMB CONTROLS RELATE TO DEUTERIUM AND TRITIUM AS WELL AS TO FISSIONABLE MATERIAL? IF THEY MUST, CAN THE PRESENT UN PLAN FULLY PROVIDE FOR THESE CONTROLS OR DOES IT REQUIRE REVISION OR CHANGES IN EMPHASIS? Should control over both fissionable material and deuterium and tritium call for the same emphasis and consideration which the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission has already given to control of U-235 and plutonium? Would surveillance of deuterium and tritium manufacture furnish better insurance against illicit H-bomb construction than surveillance of U-235 and plutonium, or is the reverse more apt to be true? Are added safeguards necessary to regulate deuterium and tritium? Or is the UN plan, as now constituted, sufficiently flexible and comprehensive to take care of light-element control? AUTHOR’S COMMENT