In the meantime Henry had been joyfully received at Seville, and acknowledged by the whole of Andalusia. Seeing himself thus master of the kingdom, except Galicia, he marched to reduce it. He closely invested Ferdinand de Castro in the city of Lugo. From Lugo the king proceeded to Burgoo, where he convened his states and obtained the necessary supplies for the defence of the kingdom. He renewed his alliance with the king of Aragon; and, in an interview with the sovereign of Navarre, on the confines of the two monarchies, he prevailed on the latter, for a gift of 60,000 pistoles, and by the promise of two fortresses, to refuse a passage to the prince of Wales. No sooner, however, was the king of Navarre returned to Pamplona, than he received messengers from the dethroned Pedro, who offered to put him in possession of Alava and Guipuzcoa, with the two important places of Logroño and Vittoria, if he would suffer the English prince to march through his territories unmolested. Charles had no difficulty in accepting the latter proposition, as he had accepted the former. The preparations of the English prince being completed early in the spring of 1367, he passed the Pyrenees at Roncesvalles, and descended into the plains of Navarre. In his combined army of English, Normans, and Gascons, were some of the flower of English chivalry. Instead of opposing his passage, Charles secretly desired Oliver de Manny, one of Edward’s generals, to seize him (the king of Navarre) while hunting in a certain place, and make him prisoner: by this contrivance he hoped to excuse his inactivity to Henry. Oliver did as directed, and the English prince pursued his march towards the Castilian frontiers. He was joined by Sir Hugh de Calverley, who preferred the loss of the new lordship of Carrion to violating a vassal’s faith by bearing arms against his natural chief. Henry also advanced; but so well was he acquainted with the valour of his renowned antagonist, that he was undetermined whether he should do more than hover round the flanks of the invaders, cut off their supplies, and force them, by famine, to return. In a council of war, however, which he assembled to hear the opinion of his officers as to the plan of the campaign, his Castilian chiefs so justly convinced him that, if he refused the battle, several towns would immediately declare for Pedro, that he resolved to risk all. No wonder that he should; for if, as Froissart[i] informs us, his army was near seventy thousand strong, he might well have little fear as to the result. One of his detachments had the advantage over a foraging party of the allies. On the 2nd of April, the two hostile armies met, west of Logroño, a few miles south of the Ebro. BATTLE OF NAJERA OR NAVARRETE (1367 A.D.) [Sidenote: [1367 A.D.]]