What Eucleidas ought to have done, when he saw the enemy’s lines advancing, was to have rushed down at once upon them; thrown their ranks into disorder; and then retired himself, step by step, to continually higher ground into a safe position: for by thus breaking them up and depriving them, to begin with, of the advantages of their peculiar armour and disposition, he would have secured the victory by the superiority of his position. But he did the very opposite of all this, and thereby forfeited the advantages of the ground. As though victory were assured, he kept his original position on the summit of the hill, with the view of catching the enemy at as great an elevation as possible, that their flight might be all the longer over steep and precipitous ground. The result, as might have been anticipated, was exactly the reverse. For he left himself no place of retreat, and by allowing the enemy to reach his position, unharmed and in unbroken order, he was placed at the disadvantage of having to give them battle on the very summit of the hill; and so, as soon as he was forced by the weight of their heavy armour and their close order to give any ground, it was immediately occupied by the Illyrians; while his own men were obliged to take lower ground, because they had no space for manœuvring on the top. The result was not long in arriving: they suffered a repulse, which the difficult and precipitous nature of the ground over which they had to retire turned into a disastrous flight. [Sidenote: Defeat of Cleomenes.]