In the first place, the jurisdiction of the ephors was extended(489) chiefly by their privilege of instituting scrutinies (εὔθυναι) into the official conduct of all magistrates, with the exception of the councillors.(490) By this indeed we are not to understand, that all magistrates, after the cessation of their office, rendered an account of their proceedings, but only that the ephors could compel them to undergo a trial, if there had been any thing suspicious in their administration; a right, however, as it extended over the ephors of the preceding year,(491) which restrained the power that it bestowed. But the ephors were not compelled to wait for the natural expiration of an office, they could suspend or deprive the officer by their judicial powers.(492) Now in this respect the king was in the very same situation with the remaining magistrates, and could, as well as the others, be brought before the tribunal of the ephors. Even before the Persian war, Cleomenes was tried before them for bribery.(493) The king was always bound to obey their summons:(494) but the fact of his not being compelled to yield till the third time, was used by Cleomenes III. as an argument to prove that the power of the ephors was originally an usurpation.(495) At the same time, their power extended in practice so far, that they could accuse the king, as well as the other magistrates, in extreme cases, without consulting the assembly, and could bring him to trial for life and death.(496) This larger court consisted of all the councillors, of the ephors, who thus came before it as accusers, besides having the right of sitting as judges, of the other king, and probably of several magistrates, who had all equal votes.(497) From this court there was no appeal; it had power to condemn the king to death;(498) although, until later times, it was prevented by a religious scruple from executing this sentence.(499) That its proceedings were commonly carried on with great propriety and composure, is stated upon the occasion of an instance to the contrary.(500) This great court of magistrates we frequently find deciding concerning public crimes with supreme authority,(501) and the ephors acting in it as accusers:(502) but that the ephors had power of themselves to punish with death, I deny most decidedly:(503) whether they had authority to banish, I even doubt.(504) The inaccuracy of later writers has confounded the steps preparatory to the sentence, with the sentence itself; a power of life and death in the hands of the ephors would have been worse than tyranny. The ephors, when they judged for themselves, were only able to impose fines, and to compel an instantaneous payment.(505) Their power of punishing the kings in this manner, or by a reprimand, was doubtless very extensive, and appears to have been subject to no limitation. Agesilaus was fined by them for endeavouring to make himself popular,(506) and Archidamus was censured for