Early in 1823, those Cubans who were more or less secretly in favor of independence sent an agent named Morales to Washington to try to discover what course the United States would pursue in case Cuba should declare her independence. It was intimated that in case Spain continued her oppressions, and did not grant Cuba a more liberal government, Cuba would ask for the protection of the United States, possibly for admission to the Union; and in case this was refused, she would appeal to England. While no definite promises were made to Cubans, it seemed to be the sentiment in Washington that, should Cuba thus offer herself, it would be tempting fate not to accept the gift. Indeed, a considerable portion of the United States was at this time eager for the annexation of Cuba. There seems moreover to have been in the American cabinet a strong feeling toward urging Cuba to declare her independence, and this might have resolved itself into promises if not into decided action, had it not been for the counter current of opinion that, should she do so, she could not maintain such a status. John Quincy Adams was sure of this, and although he felt that the time was not ripe in the United States for the adoption of a policy of annexation, yet if Cuba should fall to the United States by the mere gravitation of politics, he believed it would be folly to refuse to accept the gift, particularly since the occupation of Cuba by England would give her a base from which to proceed against the United States; and matters between England and her former possession were by no means yet settled on a basis of enduring friendship. Indeed, Adams believed that the future might make the annexation of Cuba almost indispensable to the destiny of the Union; as on April 28, 1823, he said in his instructions to the American minister at Madrid which we have already quoted.