"Cespedes and his inexperienced fellow-believers proclaimed Independence at Yara without any supply of arms or munitions of war, without provisions, clothing, etc., etc., with which to support their movement. Ignorant of what revolution is, they bunched forth just like children who heedlessly play with a wild beast, in entire ignorance of its nature. The first movement of enthusiasm on the part of the people, and of surprise on the part of the Government gave them the victory at Bayamo; and they at once thought that the Independence of Cuba was already secured. This was a fatal error, a sad illusion, which blunted the common sense and gave _loose rein to their passions_. It was the fatal error of those men who had not sufficient strength of will to be able to wait. Ah! how fatal it is not to know when to wait! "The Camagueyans were aroused at the enthusiastic shout for liberty, and they wished to help their brethren of Bayamo, driven on by a sentiment of fraternity and by their yet stronger love of liberty;--that noble aspiration which God has imbued in the hearts of all men. I shared not in these desires, although I did really in their sentiments, but I was restrained by experience and by my knowledge of the situation. Anxious to be of service to my country, I offered to go to Bayamo as a representative from Puerto Principe, which I did. "From my first steps into the Eastern Department, I was _convinced of the error_ into which the people had fallen, and the _impossibility_ of keeping up so unequal a contest. Moreover after studying the revolution and sounding the feelings of the people, I discovered that they _did not desire_ the movement but had been dragged into it; without noticing in the beginning, owing to their blind precipitation, that they were not prepared to receive a successful issue. "In some private circles I spoke of the propriety of _changing_ the cry for Independence into an acceptation of the _Cadiz programme_;--an idea which was _well received_ and seemed so to change the course of affairs, that I saw a great risk, being threatened by the few who persisted in their original intention. I spoke to Cespedes and made known to him the untimeliness of the revolution; that if he really desired the welfare of Cuba, this latter consisted in withdrawing from a war that must be ruinous and unsuccessful in the end; that the liberties offered in the Cadiz programme _were perhaps even more than would suit Cuba_, etc., etc. Cespedes, _convinced_ by my reasoning _agreed to my proposals_; and if he then failed to follow my advice it was, to use his own words, because he feared that he would not be obeyed by those who had already proclaimed for Independence. They did not understand the true policy that should be followed in the guidance of returns. They began badly and will end worse.