invulnerable system established by Henry III., attributes to the attempts at working that system "the present dearness of everything." It is almost impossible fully to represent the unwisdom of this counter-reformation. To the eye of the then legislator there was only one evil--the rising of prices. If levelly effected it was, as a matter of fact, no evil at all--far the reverse indeed, and he did not need to concern himself about it at all. Besides, it was irresistible. The evil that escaped his eye, or to which he was blind, was that unceasing process of flux which was caused by the different ratios prevailing in different parts of Europe. The scheme of Henry III. would have proved effective, where no other measure or scheme of the time was or could be, and its abrogation in 1602 by Henry IV. removed a bulwark and a barrier, and made way for catastrophe. Le Blanc considers that this repeal of the system established in 1577, itself failed of its purpose, _because the increase of prices still continued_. "In the seven years of peace which followed the ordinance of 1602, the depreciation of the gold _écu_ was as much as it had been in the preceding sixty-five years of war and trouble." The simple truth was, that it was much more likely to increase in time of peace and trade activity than in time of war. The point to notice was not at all how much the _écu_ did depreciate, but the relativity of such its depreciation with that of the standard currency of other countries, and the monetary disorder which the inequality of ratio and of rate of depreciation induced.