The situation in Korea as the year 1898 opened was something as follows. The conservatives had things well in hand and the Independence Club was passing on to its final effort and its final defeat. The work of such men as Dr. Jaisohn was still tolerated but the King and the most influential officials chafed under the wholesome advice that they received and it was evident that the first pretext would be eagerly seized for terminating a situation that was getting very awkward for both sides. The reaction was illustrated in an attack on the _Independent_ by which the Korean postal department refused to carry it in the mails. The Russians had taken the bull by the horns and were finding that they had undertaken more than they could carry through without danger of serious complications. The Russian government saw this and recalled de Speyer in time to preserve much of their influence in Seoul. The Emperor, being now in his own palace but with easy access to the Russian Legation, seems to have lent his voice to the checking of the reform propaganda and in this he was heartily seconded by his leading officials. The most promising aspect of the situation was the determined attitude of the British government relative to the enforced retirement of Dr. Brown. When it became evident that a scarcely concealed plan was on foot to oust British and other foreigners in Korea, Great Britain by a single word and by a concentration of war vessels at Chemulpo changed the whole program of the Russians; but as it appeared later the Russian plans were _only_ changed, not abandoned. So the year opened with things political in a very unsettled state. Everything was in transition. The Independents and the Russians had some idea of what they wanted but seemed to be at sea as to the means for accomplishing it. The conservatives alone sat still and held on, sure that in the long run they would triumph even if they could not stop the march of material progress in the cleaning of the streets and the building of railways.