General Ian Hamilton’s left flank was being seriously threatened along the Brandfort ridges, and their action, which seemed to them indecisive, had so far relieved the pressure that Sir Ian was able the next day to deliver his attack on Houtnek and drive the Boers from it in some confusion. The apparent failure of General Maxwell’s brigade to carry out the mission assigned to it in the flanking movement mentioned by Colonel Lumsden may be accounted for by the fact that some of the Brandfort commandos, finding themselves in danger of being cut off, had drawn back from the contemplated movement against Ian Hamilton and thrown themselves into the fight that was then raging about the spurs and kopjes of the range from which Ospruit springs. Thus they outnumbered many times the mounted troops under Colonel Henry, who, having achieved his object, wisely retired from the left, leaving the Boers in occupation of the ground they had won, but leaving them also held firmly in check there by Infantry brigades, whose presence prevented any further demonstration from Brandfort against Ian Hamilton’s left. When Lumsden’s Horse marched back to their camp that night, therefore, they might have congratulated themselves—though they didn’t—on having done remarkably good service by something more than a reconnaissance in force. The immediate result may be summed up in a few words. General Hamilton, reinforced by another Infantry brigade and by General Broadwood’s Cavalry, who rejoined him from Thaba ’Nchu way during the night, was enabled to advance early on May 1 and strike a strong blow by which, as Lord Roberts said in his despatch, ‘the enemy was signally defeated at Houtnek with comparatively small loss on our side, thanks to the admirable dispositions made by Major-General Ian Hamilton.’ To this comment Lord Roberts adds an expression of regret that the troops employed at Dewetsdorp and Wepener had been unable to cut off the enemy’s retreat and capture his guns; but during these operations the Boers, being evidently prepared for retreat whenever their safety might be threatened, moved with very little baggage, each fighting man carrying his blankets and food on a led horse. It followed, therefore, that they could escape without suffering any loss beyond that inflicted by our troops in dislodging them from their positions. This was practically the official explanation, to which one may add that Cavalry alone could not follow up effectively the retreat of Mounted Infantry every man of which knew the country and how to utilise its peculiarities for checking pursuit. By his masterly stroke at Houtnek, however, General Hamilton had achieved something more than the capture of a Boer stronghold. At the end of that action his troops were astride of the most formidable defensive position between Bloemfontein and Vaal River, and an unopposed advance two days later to Isabellafontein not only took the enemy’s entrenchments on that side of Brandfort completely