This periodical financial disturbance has been attributed to various causes. From the regularity of its appearance, it must be the result of some impelling force of a generally similar character. My opinion is, that the period of twenty years being the average time of man's active business life, the actors of the second period have not the benefit of the experience gained by those of the previous one, and they repeat the same errors that produced the former disasters; but be that as it may, when the period extending from 1873 to 1893 had passed, the same result had occurred, and with quite as much force as any of its predecessors. Land speculation had reached the point of absolute insanity. Everybody thought he could become rich if he only bought. Values, already ridiculously expanded, continued to increase with every sale. Anyone who had money enough to pay down a small amount as earnest and intelligence enough to sign a note and mortgage for the balance of the purchase price became purchasers to the limit of their credit. When a party whose credit was questioned needed an indorser, he found many requiring the same assistance who were ready to swap indorsements with him. Everyone became deeply in debt. The country was flooded with paper, which was secured on the impossibility of values continuing. The banks became loaded with alleged securities, and when the bubble was strained to the bursting point, and some one of supposed financial soundness was compelled to succumb to the pressure, the veil was lifted, which opened the eyes of the community and produced a rush for safety, which induced, and was necessarily followed, by a general collapse. In 1888 and 1889 banks suspended, money disappeared, and in 1893, in the expressive language of the West, everybody who was in debt, and all stockholders and depositors in defunct banks "went broke." Had the cities of St. Paul and Minneapolis been captured by an enemy and a ransom of ten million dollars been demanded from each, paid and carried away, the consequences upon business would not have been worse. It was much the same in all the large cities of the state, as land speculation was more active there than in the rural districts, and no matter what may happen, some value always remains to farm lands, while under such a collapse as that of 1893 the greater part of city property becomes utterly valueless for the present, and much of it forever.