The history of our Navy from its origin to the present day, 1775-1897, vol. 4 (of 4)Spears, John Randolph
History
The history of our Navy from its origin to the present day, 1775-1897, vol. 4 (of 4)
Spears, John Randolph
United States. Navy -- History; United States. Navy -- History -- Spanish-American War, 1898
Walke’s act was one of the most remarkable of that day. It was almost
without precedent that a naval officer should be independent-minded
enough to do what was right in the interests of the government without
first receiving an unmistakable order to do it. But that a man should
save a fort for the government by actually disobeying the order of
a superior--that was then unheard of, though an officer of a higher
grade saved three fine ships from the _Merrimac_ in like fashion some
time later. By concentrating the army forces at Pickens, contrary to
Armstrong’s orders, Walke saved the fort. Then, when the yard had been
surrendered to the Confederates, he took the paroled officers and men,
with their families, from the yard and carried them to New York. This,
although done in the interest of the government, and as an act of
humanity, was also contrary to his original order which contemplated a
passage to Vera Cruz. So Walke was court-martialled, found guilty, and
sentenced to be censured! This is perhaps the only case on record where
the legal censure of an American naval officer was as a badge of honor.
[Illustration: Henry Walke.
_From a photograph._]
Meantime the Buchanan administration was in some way moved, after
the navy yard was captured, to send the _Brooklyn_ down there with
eighty-six artillery men and 115 marines. But before these could be
landed the administration repented, and the _Brooklyn_ was ordered
to lie off the harbor. And there she lay when Mr. Lincoln came into
office. On March 12th an order was sent to Capt. J. Vodges, commanding
the artillery company on the _Brooklyn_, to land. This order was
received by Vodges on March 31st, and on April 1st he called on Capt.
H. A. Adams, of the _Brooklyn_, for boats, etc., for the landing.
Instead of giving them, Adams declined, and wrote a letter to the
Navy Department, saying that the order to Vodges “may have been given
without a full knowledge of the condition of affairs here.” He was
sure that reinforcing the fort “would be viewed as a hostile act, and
would be resisted to the utmost.” The department was warned that “it
would be a serious thing to bring on, by precipitation, a collision.”
In short, this officer, who was a Union man, had been cajoled into a
state of mind where he ignored the fact that the Confederates were
working day and night to place their defences in the best possible
order and were adding to their forces daily. He had, in truth, been
instructed by Buchanan’s Secretary of the Navy “not to land the company
unless said fort shall be attacked _or preparations be made for its
attack_.” The italics are not in the original document, of course, but
they are inserted to make plain the way in which Adams ignored the
Confederate work of preparing to capture Fort Pickens by increasing
the effectiveness of Fort McRae and Fort Barrancas. To land a man in
Fort Pickens would be “viewed as a hostile act,” and would “bring on,
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