The History of Philosophy in IslamBoer, T. J. de (Tjitze J.)
Islamic
The History of Philosophy in Islam
Boer, T. J. de (Tjitze J.)
Islamic philosophy -- History
Just as Logic has to give an account of the principles of knowledge, so
Ethics have to deal with the fundamental rules of conduct, although, in
the latter, somewhat more value is attached to practice and experience
than in the theory of knowledge. In the treatment of this subject
Farabi agrees sometimes with Plato, and sometimes with Aristotle; but
occasionally, in a mystic and ascetic fashion, he goes farther than
either of them. In opposition to the Theologians, who recognize, no
doubt, a knowledge gained by Reason, but not rules of conduct taught by
Reason, Farabi frequently affirms with emphasis that Reason decides
whether a thing is good or evil. Why should not that Reason, which has
been imparted to us from above, decide upon conduct, seeing that the
highest virtue certainly consists in knowing? In vigorously accentuated
terms Farabi declares that if one man knew everything that stands in
the writings of Aristotle, but did not act in accordance with his
knowledge, while another man shaped his conduct in accordance with
Aristotle’s teaching, without being acquainted with it, the preference
would have to be assigned to the former. Knowledge takes a higher
position than the moral act; otherwise it could not decide upon the
act.
By its very nature the Soul desires. In so far as it perceives and
represents, it has a will, just like the lower animals. But man alone
possesses freedom of choice, seeing that this rests upon rational
consideration. Pure thought is the sphere of freedom. Thus it is a
freedom which depends upon motives furnished by thinking,—a freedom
which is at the same time necessity, inasmuch as in the last resort it
is determined by the rational nature of God. In this sense Farabi is a
Determinist.
On account of the opposition offered by matter, the freedom of man, as
thus conceived, can only imperfectly vindicate its lordship over the
Sensible. It does not become perfect till the rational soul has been
enfranchised from the bonds of matter and the wrappings of error,—in
the life of the Spirit. But that is the highest blessedness which is
striven after for its own sake, and consequently it is plainly the
Good. Such good the Human Soul is seeking, when it turns to the Spirit
above it, just as the Spirits of the heavens do, when they draw near to
the Highest.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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