It has been seen that under the government of Sir E. Wilmot an act was passed to restrict the increase of dogs, and another levying 15 per cent. duties. The owners of dogs were required to take out a license, and the proceeds of the tax were carried to the general revenue. Some of the settlers never complied with this ordinance, and others paid under protest. According to the opinion of several lawyers the council by this enactment had exceeded its powers. The act of parliament by which the council was constituted contained a provision to the effect that a tax should be levied only for local purposes, "to be distinctly and particularly stated in the body of the bill." It was contended that the restriction was violated, since the Dog Act contained no specific appropriation, and the amount was carried to the general revenue. The government, willing to avoid the trial of this point, did not hasten to enforce the penalty. It was understood that Judge Montagu had not obtained a license for dogs on his premises, and Mr. Morgan, then editor of the _Britannia_, announced to the government that he was an owner of dogs, that he had paid no license fee, and intended to pay none. The chief constable was directed to recover the penalties. Mr. Morgan being fined, appealed to the quarter sessions, and then to the supreme court. The judges, having heard the arguments of counsel, declared that the Dog Act imposed a tax and exceeded the powers of the council. They therefore annulled the decision of the inferior courts (Nov. 22, 1847). The views which dictated this judgment affected a more important act--the Differential Duties. Several merchants paid these charges under protest, and entered their suit for recovery. A revenue of L20,000 per annum was thus in peril. It was stated by the governor and crown lawyers that the judges themselves had passed the lawful limits of their jurisdiction, unsettled the whole body of colonial law, encouraged opposition to the government, and exposed its agents to vexatious prosecutions. The governor was determined to resist their judgment. The warrants for the members of the council had not arrived. Thus recourse to the legislature was impracticable, and the most obvious remedy was the removal of the judges, and the substitution of others, whose opinions were known to agree with the executive. The judges were charged, therefore, with a neglect of duty in omitting, as authorised by the law, to certify illegality in the Act prior to its enrolment; and by permitting the question of an act of council, they were said to override the legislature.[248]