The powers of the grand jury devolved on the judge advocate, who framed the indictment, and determined beforehand the probability of guilt: he thus sat in a cause which he had judged already. The prosecutor conducted his own case: witnesses were examined in open court, and the accused was unassisted by counsel. Nor was unanimity required: yet five in seven were necessary in capital cases, to authorise an immediate execution. The judge advocate deliberated with his co-jurors in secret, and the court was re-opened only when they had agreed upon their verdict, and determined the sentence. Thus in ordinary cases the weight of authority in deciding guilt, as well as apportioning punishment, usually rested with an officer officially connected with the government. The operation of this court was liable to serious constitutional objections. It was in the power of the governor to exclude the subject from the protection of the law, by shutting up the court, and by the arbitrary selection of its members to anticipate its decision. In conducting the business of the court, its members dispensed with the niceties of law, and gave their verdict upon what appeared to be the substantial merits of the case. From the age of fourteen, the first judge advocate had been employed in the royal marine service, and whatever intelligence his writings display, they exhibit utter disregard of rights recognised by the British constitution. His successors in office, for two-and-twenty years, until the appointment of Mr. Ellis Bent, were gentlemen connected with the military profession, who were unassisted, except by such lawyers as the lottery of transportation threw in their way: thus, while they were limited by parliament to a jurisdiction according to the laws of the realm,[79] they were more than usually unacquainted with their nature, and indifferent to their observance. Such were the inherent defects of this form of judicature, from the large influence possessed by the executive; which could determine the time of sitting and the members of the court; which denied the right of challenge, and accepted the concurrence of five voices only in cases of life and death--and those of persons subject to the influence of the governor and unaccustomed to weigh evidence, or to defer to the maxims of civil tribunals. But if the constitution of the court was a subject of just complaint, the creation of new offences by unauthorised legislation, was still less acceptable to English statists. The court proceeded smoothly, so long as none but convicts or persons of trivial influence were in question; but the dispute with Governor Bligh disclosed the dangers with which it was fraught: the sympathy of the jurors with the accused frustrated his prosecution, and overthrew the executive.