In 1859 we were pushed hard by the mutinies in India, had scarcely recovered from the effects of the Crimean War, and the reduction of our forces to a peace establishment, and knowing our unprepared condition, the nation then, through the voice of Parliament, insisted on information from the Government of the day as to how we really stood, and in the event of prevailing reports becoming true, in what manner they were prepared to meet the emergency; the stereotyped answer being received, "that in due course of time all would be arranged, and that the departments were in perfect order, having worked hard, and were working most judiciously and economically," the country took upon itself to see things in their proper light, and knowing that invasion was possible, raised the Volunteer Force. That Volunteer Force we still retain. They have become a well-trained, reliable, and very valuable body of men, but fitted only for garrison duties. The infantry are clothed and equipped but for the day--having neither boots nor underclothing, and in too many cases stamina, such as would enable them to undergo one week's exposure in bad weather or in winter before an active and terribly resolute enemy. The artillery are without guns, and ignorant of the use of field guns, nor have they the means of moving light guns or guns of position, even had they all been instructed in their use. The broken reed of trusting to neighbouring farmers, brewers, omnibus proprietors, &c., for horseflesh is sure to fail. It cannot be otherwise. On a sudden call all would be brought together, new to their work and new to each other. Men, drivers, horses, with harness and equipments probably obsolete, not unlikely rotten, and fitting so badly as to produce nothing but pain and galls. One day's march means two days' halt under such circumstances. If the fleet were badly beaten in the Mediterranean, or even in the eastern seas, the demand for assistance would be made on the home authorities and the number of vessels guarding the Channel considerably diminished, weakened, or rendered powerless by a call for their services elsewhere; in other words, the _complete_ command of the Channel lost, and this being so, invasion is not only possible, but most probably would occur. A few heavily-armed vessels as guard-ships, and with less than two hundred thousand tons of shipping at the enemy's disposal, one hundred thousand men could be landed with ease, perfectly equipped and ready for action on very many parts of our shores. The voyage is short, large steamers, probably of low power but adapted for troops, and various other vessels would be obtained without difficulty; and, as before observed, with the command of the Channel no longer in English power, would again and again repeat the voyage, not improbably with impunity, or at best with feeble opposition.