The period in reserve was not without incident. To begin with, General Headquarters' pamphlet S.S. 143, "The Training of Platoons for Offensive Action," had just been issued. It contained a scheme for the employment of a platoon as a small force of all arms--one section Lewis gunners, one rifle grenadiers, one bombers, and one riflemen, with a platoon headquarters consisting of the officer, platoon sergeant, runner, and signaller. Each battalion was now ordered to tell off one platoon for special instruction in this latest scheme. This was not particularly difficult, except that the average strength of a platoon and its four sections never approached the strength of the "War Establishment" platoon for whose instruction these illuminating pamphlets were always designed. The selection of ground proved far more difficult, but an open space in the vicinity of the Nieppe Bridge, where some old practice trenches stood, afforded reasonable facilities at a moderate distance from the billets. The Second-in-Command, Major H. K. Wilson, undertook to find a site, and ultimately decided upon what seemed suitable for the purpose. Unfortunately, the site selected had also been chosen as the position for certain silent batteries and defensive machine-gun companies, who watched Major Wilson making notes in his notebook and arrested him as a suspected person. Major Wilson persuaded the machine gunners to accompany him to Battalion Headquarters, whence, after he had been identified, they retired, feeling no doubt that they had at least done their duty. The incident caused considerable merriment, but to no one more than to the officer chiefly concerned. The shelling of Armentières by the enemy had recently become a daily and nightly operation. Our gradual increase of guns of major calibre hidden among the houses--there were two 8-inch howitzers in a garden in the Rue Bayard--was quite sufficient to attract hostile notice. Apart from Armentières itself, the enemy had also been busy shelling many back areas, and in retaliation the Second Army decided on a general back area shoot, commencing at 7.30 p.m. on April 7th, and all ranks were warned to keep under cover. The shoot duly commenced, but in spite of the din we heard what sounded uncommonly like a barrage on the 2/7th K.L.R. front. However, we imagined, as at first did they, that this was the anticipated retaliation. At 7.45 p.m. a false gas alarm occurred, but at 8 p.m. the order came for the battalion to stand-to. The raid for which we thought the Germans had been registering had actually come off, and, as ill-luck would have it, at the same moment as our area shoot. At 10.15 p.m. we were ordered to send up a company to reinforce the 2/7th K.L.R., and "D" Company duly moved off, returning at dawn the next morning without casualties. A further barrage at 10 p.m. caused a second stand-to, but the fire died away in a short time, and normal conditions were finally re-established.