It had now become clear that if the Division was to be opposed in the big attack by these Bavarians, it would meet an enemy who would offer the maximum of resistance. It therefore was a matter of first importance to ensure that the men fully understood that success would depend on the speed with which they reached the enemy parapet after the barrage had left. It may be said that there would be a race for success. While the barrage was on the trench, the Bavarians would be on the dug-out step, and the Highlanders would be waiting from seventy to a hundred yards short of the trench. As the barrage lifted the race began. Would the Bavarian reach his fire-step and open fire on the Highlanders, or would the Highlanders reach the parapet and shoot the Bavarian down before he could man his trenches? The men learnt to appreciate this fact, and all developed the fixed determination that they would stick close to the barrage whatever else might happen. The result was that when the day came in the first phase of the battle the issue was never in doubt. The plan of the attack was as follows: A frontage of just over 3000 yards, gradually increasing up to 4000 yards, was allotted to the Highland Division. The depth to which it was hoped the attack would be carried was 5500 yards. The 152nd Infantry Brigade was to attack on the right, the 154th Brigade on the left; on the right of the Division the 34th Division carried on the attack, and to the left the Canadian Corps. The Highland Division was the left flank Division both of the XVIIth Corps and of the Third Army. The attack was divided up into three main objectives, known as: First objective, the Black line; second objective, the Blue line; third objective, the Brown line; while there was a further objective towards which his attempts, if successful, were to be exploited, known as the Green line. Before reaching the Black line in all parts of the front, three lines, and in some places four lines, of hostile trenches had to be overcome, as well as numerous communication trenches which contained dug-outs. Between the Black line and the Blue line, as far as the 152nd Brigade was concerned, lay only two lines of trenches, of which one was in close support to the other. In front of the 154th Brigade the country between the Black and Blue lines was intersected by numerous communication trenches, which led into a central redoubt. In addition, a heavily-wired fire trench traversing the whole brigade front passed through this redoubt. In consequence, on the left there was little chance of a straightforward attack behind the barrage being completely successful, as it could not be accurately foreshadowed where, in the maze of trenches, resistance was most likely to be met. [Illustration: MAP IV.--CAPTURE OF VIMY RIDGE, 9TH APRIL 1917.]