So ended a most sanguinary encounter. From most difficultly-situated assembly trenches, an attack had been launched against a position of considerable strength. It had been supported by a weak barrage. Moreover, as the enemy's defences were ill-defined and composed in many places of unlocated shell-holes, the barrage could not have that precision which obtains in a trench to trench attack. From the outset, in most part of the attack, the barrage was lost, and such advances as were carried out were made by unsupported infantry, with the exception of the brilliant action of the tank. The men had advanced against a stout opposition and had suffered heavy casualties, had then been systematically bombarded in shallow trenches and shell-holes, and had been repeatedly counter-attacked. They, however, maintained a portion of their gains against all comers, and had appreciably deepened the area held east of the Scarpe. The artillery had played a large part in the destruction of many hostile counter-attacks, and had afforded our troops great protection against the action of the enemy's infantry. The losses which the gunners had inflicted on the enemy were such that by nightfall he was not in a position to attempt any action on a large scale, and could do no more than reoccupy the chemical works. In one respect, however, the artillery were at a disadvantage. The enemy had withdrawn his guns so far to the rear that he could do little more with most of his pieces than shell our trenches and foremost battery positions at their extreme range. In consequence, it was difficult to counter his batteries. Efforts were made to push forward heavy howitzers for this purpose, but his observation was so good that he was able to knock many of these out. In one case, a four-gun 92 howitzer battery had five guns put out of action in twenty-four hours, a fresh gun which had been sent forward as a replacement meeting the same fate as its predecessors. Moreover, his guns were so placed that he could concentrate on to the chemical works the artillery, not only of the corps operating against it, but also of the corps on either flank. The artillery commanders, both field and heavy, did their utmost to check the shelling of the infantry, but they were able to produce little effect. The Division had been continually in the line since February, had fought for three days in the battle of 9-12th April, and had had only forty-eight hours' rest before again taking over a battle front. In these circumstances the battle of Roeux and the "Comical" works, as the Jocks called it, gave abundant evidence of the magnificent fighting qualities of the troops.