The History of the 51st (Highland) Division 1914-1918Bewsher, F. W. (Frederick William)
History
The History of the 51st (Highland) Division 1914-1918
Bewsher, F. W. (Frederick William)
Great Britain. Army. Division, 51st (Highland); World War, 1914-1918 -- Regimental histories -- Great Britain
In addition to this work, accommodation had to be provided for the
maximum number of men in the canal bank. Unfortunately, the canal area
allotted to this Division contained the high-level broad-gauge railway
causeway and the low-level causeway adjacent to Bridge 4, both of which
excited great interest and attracted very heavy shelling from the
Boches, who made every endeavour to destroy them by bombardment. Bridge
4 was broken so frequently that in July it was decided that it could not
be kept open for wheeled traffic, and that the low-level causeway alone
would have to be used. Both banks of the canal in the vicinity of these
causeways were involved in these bombardments, with the result that much
of the work expended on the erection of shelters was destroyed.
During the whole of this period, two field companies, R.E., and the 8th
Royal Scots lived in the canal bank, subjected to heavy and continuous
shelling, including a lavish use of gas. Throughout the month of July
there was barely a single evening in which they were not heavily
bombarded.
As regards the preparation of the troops for the attack, it can safely
be said that no troops have been given a better opportunity of training
for a particular operation than was the Highland Division in this
instance.
General Maxse, the Corps commander, took the greatest interest in the
training, visiting each brigade and lecturing to all the officers. Large
training areas were hired, and so that officers and men might form some
impression of the German position, which they could not see, a large
model was made, about the size of four tennis courts, in which hills,
valleys, streams, houses, roads, woods, trenches, &c., were all
accurately represented by models. Platforms were then erected at
intervals round it, from which officers could point out to their men the
appearance of the area which they would traverse during the operations.
In some battalions each platoon made similar models in the orchards
round their billets, showing all the features in the area allotted to
their companies for the attack.
An exact replica of the German trenches was also marked out with
tracing-tapes on the training ground full size, in which every known
trench and farm was represented. The troops were then practised on this
course until they could find their way to their objectives according to
plan, without any officers taking part in the exercise. The men were
also carefully trained in the manner in which each post was to dig
itself in during consolidation, and how to pile the earth as it was
excavated, so that it at no time obscured their field of fire to their
front.
The attack was not delivered until 31st July, so that the Division was
given six weeks in which to make its preparations. During this period
the plans for the operation, as well as the training of the troops, were
perfected down to the minutest details.
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