The History of the 51st (Highland) Division 1914-1918Bewsher, F. W. (Frederick William)
History
The History of the 51st (Highland) Division 1914-1918
Bewsher, F. W. (Frederick William)
Great Britain. Army. Division, 51st (Highland); World War, 1914-1918 -- Regimental histories -- Great Britain
Later the left battalion, the 5th Seaforth Highlanders, carried out some
satisfactory shooting. On one occasion in the early morning they arose
to find a platoon of forty strong, in marching order, advancing within
close range of them. They immediately wiped it out. On another occasion
they inflicted by enfilade fire such heavy losses on a storm trupp
attempting to raid the 12th Battalion King's Royal Rifles on their left
that the survivors of the storm trupp, twenty-three in number, ran
towards the King's Royal Rifles with their hands up and surrendered.
The total casualties to the Division during the operations were 45
officers and 1110 other ranks, the 154th Brigade, which carried out the
attack, losing 32 officers and 891 other ranks, and the 4th Gordon
Highlanders 12 officers.
On 26th September the 152nd Infantry Brigade was relieved by the 32nd
Infantry Brigade, 11th Division, and on the 27th the G.O.C., 11th
Division, took over the command of the line.
This battle affords an admirable illustration of the economic use of
troops. It must be remembered that only five battalions were employed in
the attack and subsequent counter-attacks; that these five
battalions--though through want of ammunition they did not hold their
entire gains--had established themselves for a while in their final
objective, and had accounted for every German garrisoning the area
allotted to them for attack. Moreover, these battalions were fighting
not only facing their front, but also facing their left flank, as the
Division on their left had not made equal progress in the attack. That
it was possible for so few men to do what they did was due to two
things: first, to the combination of gallantry and skill on the part of
the men and the leadership and initiative on the part of the officers
and N.C.O.'s. The men had been trained in the use of ground, movement
supported by fire, and in platoon tactics in general, and they put what
they had learned into practice from the outset of the attack. The enemy
fought bravely, perhaps as bravely as our men, but he was outmatched in
tactical skill, and was in consequence defeated.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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