The History of the 51st (Highland) Division 1914-1918Bewsher, F. W. (Frederick William)
History
The History of the 51st (Highland) Division 1914-1918
Bewsher, F. W. (Frederick William)
Great Britain. Army. Division, 51st (Highland); World War, 1914-1918 -- Regimental histories -- Great Britain
During this action the enemy made several attempts to defeat the whole
attack by cutting in across the Bapaume-Cambrai road (south-west of the
village), a form of counter-attack to which an attack from a salient is
particularly liable. All his attempts in this direction collapsed under
the fire of rifles and Lewis guns.
By the early afternoon the situation had become stationary, the
surviving tanks all having returned from the village.
A fresh attack was therefore planned, as it would have been impossible
for the 6th Seaforth Highlanders to maintain themselves in their
advanced position unless some effort was made to relieve the pressure on
their flanks. Two companies of the 5th Seaforth Highlanders were
therefore ordered to advance through Anneux to the south-east corner of
Bourlon Wood, now in the hands of the 40th Division, and forming up
there, to attempt to clear Fontaine by bombing in conjunction with a
fresh company of twelve tanks. At the same time, it was arranged that
100 rifles of the 6th Gordon Highlanders and two companies of the 8th
Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders should form up on the right flank and
co-operate in the attack.
Immediately before the hour fixed for the operation to begin, the enemy
successfully counter-attacked the 40th Division in Bourlon Wood, and
uncovered the left flank of the 6th Seaforth Highlanders. They had, in
consequence, to fall back, with the result that the situation west of
Fontaine became uncertain.
However, while this withdrawal was taking place, the tanks had begun
their advance through a heavy artillery barrage, which accompanied the
German counter-attack on Bourlon Wood. Several of them were put out of
action by direct hits, in consequence of which some confusion and
disorganisation arose, which resulted in none of the tanks entering the
village on the front of the two companies of the 5th Seaforth
Highlanders.
In view of the intensity of the machine-gun fire which was being poured
out of Fontaine, it seemed clear that an attack unsupported by tanks had
no possible chance of success. The enterprise was therefore abandoned,
and the men withdrew and dug in so as to form a connecting link between
the 6th Seaforth Highlanders and the troops south of the village.
This gallant attack on Fontaine illustrates the extreme difficulty of
taking an undemolished village with or without tanks, if strongly held
and organised for defence, unless there is sufficient time available to
subject it to a severe and thorough bombardment.
No further changes in the situation occurred, except that after dusk the
line was so adjusted as to be continuous from the left of the 6th
Seaforth Highlanders in the south-east corner of Bourlon Wood to the
right of the 9th Royal Scots south-east of Cantaing.
During the night of the 23-24th the Division was relieved by the Guards
Division, and a continuous line was handed over five miles in advance of
the trenches occupied by the Division at zero hour on the 20th.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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