The History of the 51st (Highland) Division 1914-1918Bewsher, F. W. (Frederick William)
History
The History of the 51st (Highland) Division 1914-1918
Bewsher, F. W. (Frederick William)
Great Britain. Army. Division, 51st (Highland); World War, 1914-1918 -- Regimental histories -- Great Britain
In some cases, if the crater formed by a mine explosion was some
distance from the British front line, no infantry action would follow.
If, however, a mine was blown under a British trench, it was usually
accompanied by an enemy raid, which was planned to enter our trenches
during the confusion caused by the mine and surprise the surviving
garrison. If, on the other hand, it was blown in No Man's Land close to
the British front line, it was necessary at all costs to prevent the
enemy from occupying it. Thus in the two last cases heavy infantry
fighting often occurred. In the latter case, the object of these actions
was to prevent the enemy from establishing himself on the crater. If he
did so the position was serious, for the crater became a permanent
menace to the security of our lines. Where the ground might have been
flat, a large hollow mound had now arisen. If the enemy established
himself on the British side of the mound (_i.e._, the near lip, as it
was called), he might construct sniping-posts which would dominate the
trenches. Should he only establish himself on the far lip, he still was
able, by working around the lip of the crater towards the flank, to
shoot down into our trenches in enfilade.
It was suggested that the Germans, by some peculiar method of tamping
(_i.e._, packing the explosive in the chamber), used to blow his craters
with the far lip higher than the near lip. Thus, if he only established
himself on the far lip, the near lip, being lower, did not obscure his
view to the front; conversely the view from the near lip, if occupied by
the British, was obscured to the front by the higher far lip. Whether
his craters were formed in this manner from accident (_i.e._, the lie of
the ground) or from design is not clear. The fact remained that an
examination of many craters in the Neuville St Vaast area proved this to
be the case.
These crater fights often developed into considerable minor operations
involving many casualties. They almost always took place in the dark,
and were an unpleasant ordeal for all concerned.
The crater, still smoking from its base like a miniature volcano; the
stench of the fumes; the whiteness of the freshly-turned chalk standing
out in the darkness, produced a setting which intensified the normal
horrors of battle.
When the German blew a mine he, of course, knew the hour and the place
at which the explosion would occur. He knew also from the depth of his
gallery and from the amount of explosive used how close to the spot his
assaulting troops might assemble without fear from the falling débris.
He was also able to assemble dumps of loophole plates, prepared and
portable obstacles, bombs, &c., close to the scene of operations. The
troops might or might not have been warned that a mine was to be
expected in a certain area.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account