The History of the 51st (Highland) Division 1914-1918Bewsher, F. W. (Frederick William)
History
The History of the 51st (Highland) Division 1914-1918
Bewsher, F. W. (Frederick William)
Great Britain. Army. Division, 51st (Highland); World War, 1914-1918 -- Regimental histories -- Great Britain
In these circumstances he therefore started with the odds considerably
in his favour; and yet, as will be seen, as far as the Highland Division
was concerned, he seldom met with the success he anticipated.
His plan was to form up his consolidating party as close to the place
where the crater was to be blown as was safe. He then blew the mine, and
simultaneously opened a barrage of artillery, trench-mortars, and rifle
grenades, &c., on the two flanks and on the British side of the crater.
He thus hoped to deny to our troops access to it. Under cover of this
barrage he then rushed his assaulting parties up to the crater, and
attempted to consolidate posts both on the near and far lips.
Immediately, therefore, that a mine was blown, parties had to be
organised to rush to the crater and seize at least the near lip. These
parties had, of course, no previous knowledge as to the time at which
the mine was to be exploded. They were also liable to be temporarily
disorganised in the general confusion caused by the explosion. Thus, as
a rule, when the crater fighting began, the enemy was already on the
near lip before our parties were fairly on the scene.
A closely-contested fight would then ensue with bombs, Lewis guns, and
rifles, and would continue until the enemy had been ejected at all
events from the near lip. Posts would then be established on it, and a
sap would be dug connecting the posts to the foremost British trench.
In these encounters casualties were frequently heavy, as the parties had
often to pass through a heavy barrage, followed by their bomb carriers.
The latter were employed in large numbers, as in this form of warfare
several hundred bombs were often thrown in one night.
On first taking over, the mining situation was obscure. The French
tunnellers had been withdrawn, leaving only old French Territorials to
man the listening galleries. These veterans considered this duty _très
dangereux_, as indeed it was.
In consequence, the period was marked by a constant state of anxiety as
to what portions of the line were safe from the possibility of being
blown up at any moment.
However, on the arrival of the British tunnelling companies, which were
again largely reinforced by the coal miners in the Division, accurate
information was soon obtained as regards the enemy's underground
activity. The defensive galleries were first perfected, so that timely
warning could be given of any mine that he was likely to explode. By
this means camouflets could be used to hinder his progress. Subsequently
it became possible to take the offensive, and mines were blown to
destroy his crater positions and trenches.
Later, when heavy calls were made upon the German troops to sustain the
fighting on the Somme, they were compelled to relax their efforts in
this sector, with the result that the British tunnellers established a
marked superiority over them.
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