This was the first occasion on which the Division had employed machine-guns to fire an overhead barrage during the attack. The men were accordingly specially warned that the enormous volume of bullets passing over their heads would sound as if they were only a few inches above the crowns of their steel helmets, whereas in reality there would be a margin of safety of many feet. This warning proved to be a sound precaution when the barrage was first to be experienced, since the bullets seemed unpleasantly close and might have otherwise created despondency and alarm. The trench-mortar batteries were also fully occupied, and were continually employed in wire-cutting and assisting the raids and trench bombardments. The attack was originally planned for 24th October, but owing to the weather a succession of postponements took place. The first postponement was until 30th October; on 25th October a further postponement of forty-eight hours was ordered. On 29th October the date of the attack was changed to 5th November. Later, it was again postponed to 9th November, and again to 10th November. On 7th November information was wired that the attack was indefinitely postponed. On 10th November it was ordered to take place on 13th November. On 11th November the hour for zero--that is, the hour at which the infantry advance begins--was selected as 5.45 A.M. The weather, which was responsible for these postponements, could not well have been worse. The country had become water-logged owing to excessive downpours of rain. Continual mists and the absence of wind prevented the rain from being absorbed in the atmosphere. The ground thus remained sodden, the roads were reduced to a pulp, and tracks and paths became lost in oozing mud of the consistency of porridge. In fact, the state of the ground had become so bad that a small raid which took place on 11th November failed because the raiding party found it a physical impossibility to keep up with a very slow-moving barrage. Not an officer or a man could move a yard at the double. The results of this spell of bad weather were such that for a period not more than four lorries daily per Division were allowed on the roads, for fear that the foundations of the road would disappear permanently into the abyss of mud beneath them. The inconvenience caused to "Q" by this unavoidable restriction was immense, but the ingenuity of the quartermaster's staff, as usual, overcame the difficulty with marked success.