The History of the Confederate War, Its Causes and Its Conduct, Volume 1 (of 2): A Narrative and Critical HistoryEggleston, George Cary
History
The History of the Confederate War, Its Causes and Its Conduct, Volume 1 (of 2): A Narrative and Critical History
Eggleston, George Cary
United States -- History -- Civil War, 1861-1865
These things are perhaps tedious to the reader. But their just
consideration is absolutely necessary to any really impartial inquiry
into the history of the war, such as this work is intended to be.
CHAPTER XIII
"PEPPER BOX" STRATEGY
The moment Virginia adopted an ordinance of secession the authorities
on both sides recognized the fact that that state was destined to be
the chief battle ground of the war, and especially that the first and
perhaps the decisive actions of the struggle were likely to occur
there. Accordingly both sides began at once to hurry troops to that
borderland--the South sending them to such vantage points in Virginia
as might most seriously threaten Washington, the North sending them
to the capital city for its defense and for that march upon Richmond
which, it was hoped at the North, might be quickly decisive of the war
in favor of the Federal arms.
The Confederate General Forrest is reported to have defined "strategy"
as the art of "getting there first with the most men." This was what
each side at that time was endeavoring to do.
Richmond was not yet selected as the Confederate capital, but its
choice as such was already foreshadowed as a necessary requirement
alike of geography and politics, and within a brief while the
foreshadowing became a fact. In the meanwhile it was accepted in
advance as a certainty, and the two capitals confronted each other at a
distance of scarcely more than a hundred miles, as the crow flies.
The Southern States poured troops into Richmond as rapidly as they
could. The Northern States poured troops into Washington for the
defense of that capital with all possible energy and enterprise.
Neither upon the one side nor upon the other were the men soldiers
in any proper acceptation of the term. They were raw levies. From
the North they were mainly men who had passed their young lives in
commerce, in study or in other peaceful pursuits. From the South they
were mainly the sons of planters or the sons of overseers, accustomed
in either case from their youth up to the use of gunpowder, and to
the employment of those arms in the use of which gunpowder is a prime
factor. The Southern youths were accustomed to outdoor life, to camp
fare, to self-dependence, to self-sacrifice, if need be. The Northern
youth in the main were accustomed to nothing of the sort.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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