The History of the Confederate War, Its Causes and Its Conduct, Volume 1 (of 2): A Narrative and Critical HistoryEggleston, George Cary
History
The History of the Confederate War, Its Causes and Its Conduct, Volume 1 (of 2): A Narrative and Critical History
Eggleston, George Cary
United States -- History -- Civil War, 1861-1865
Then occurred that insane panic in the Federal army which has never
been explained or accounted for except upon the insufficient ground
that its victims were men without discipline and wholly unused to
war. The explanation leaves much to be desired. The men who yielded
to that panic impulse had already on that day proved themselves brave
fellows, quite capable of doing soldiers' work right gallantly. They
had fought with vigor, determination and high courage through long and
bloody hours. They had been the assailants where assault required a
greater courage than defense and they had done their soldierly work
altogether well. They had been baffled of victory in the crowning
hour of the battle, but they perfectly knew that their columns still
outnumbered those of their adversary, and they must have known that in
an orderly withdrawal from the scene of the conflict they were not in
the least degree likely to be destructively assailed in their turn.
Nothing was more unlikely indeed, than that the Confederates, having
exhausted their freshness of vigor in the battle and having achieved
their immediate purpose by repelling their enemy's assault, would in
their turn advance upon that enemy, still outnumbering them, if he had
withdrawn in good order and taken up a strong defensive position at
Centreville, only a few miles away. Had the Federal Army done that,
preserving its cohesion and presenting a determined front, it is indeed
certain that the Confederates would not have cared to convert their
successful defense into a more than doubtful offense; and even had that
happened through Confederate over-confidence, the opportunity of the
Federals to convert their own defeat into a conspicuous victory would
have been as tempting as any that an army could desire.
Later in the war after the two armies had been molded into
effectiveness by the stern discipline of service, some such course as
this would undoubtedly have been pursued. But at Manassas the event was
startlingly different. No sooner did the Federal troops that had fought
so gallantly on the right of their line find their assault repelled and
themselves forced back than all cohesion, all discipline, all soldierly
qualities went out of them. They broke ranks and fled in a positively
demented panic, which unfortunately proved to be instantly and
universally contagious. The whole army fell into confusion. Even those
parts of it which had successfully held their own in severe conflicts
throughout the battle hours broke ranks and ran as an unorganized mob
might at the advance of a force of regulars armed with bayonets.
The Confederates, flushed with unexpected victory achieved in the
moment of defeat, pursued them with all the quick-moving forces
available, chief among these being Stuart's small body of Virginia
cavalry.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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