The History of the Confederate War, Its Causes and Its Conduct, Volume 1 (of 2): A Narrative and Critical HistoryEggleston, George Cary
History
The History of the Confederate War, Its Causes and Its Conduct, Volume 1 (of 2): A Narrative and Critical History
Eggleston, George Cary
United States -- History -- Civil War, 1861-1865
Multitudes of the fugitives from the Manassas battle never returned
to their duty. In many cases their term of service expired about that
time, so that they could not be brought back by virtue of any law,
civil or military. In other cases it was not thought worth while to
drag back into the service men whose demoralization was too complete
to admit of the hope that they might ever again be made effective
soldiers. But their places were promptly taken by eager, patriotic
young men, and General McClellan, with that rare capacity for
organizing which was the distinguishing characteristic of his genius,
molded the raw levies with almost incredible rapidity into effective
regiments and brigades, a task in which, as has already been shown, the
Confederates mightily aided him.
But in the meanwhile, the victory of the Confederates very seriously
threatened the Federal cause with a new and terrible danger--namely,
the danger of the recognition of the Southern Confederacy as an
independent power. Great European nations under the lead of France and
England had already recognized the claim of the Southern armies to
belligerent rights. That was a measure of humanity and civilization so
obviously proper and necessary that while it temporarily angered the
North, and was construed there as an unfriendly act, it was presently
and of necessity accepted by the Federal Government which, in its turn,
made an informal but none the less effective recognition of belligerent
rights on the part of the Southern armies. Without such recognition
it would have been impossible to carry on the war upon anything like
civilized lines. Without it no prisoner could have been exchanged, no
flag of truce could have been recognized, no cartels could have been
agreed upon, no safe-conducts could have been respected--in short,
without such Federal recognition of belligerent rights on the part of
the Southerners the struggle must have speedily degenerated into a
savage contest. All prisoners in that case would have been at the mercy
of their captors to do with as they pleased. There would have been no
possible opportunity for negotiation or for the interchange of any of
those amenities, by means of which the horrors of war are so greatly
mitigated to individuals. There could have been no paroles. On both
sides the prisoners would have been in the position of captives to a
savage foe, responsible in no way to civilization.
The recognition of Southern belligerency was so obviously a necessity
of civilization that the Federal commanders had already assumed it,
quite as a matter of course, from the beginning, and they had daily
acted upon it. But the people, uninstructed as they were in military
law, deeply resented England's act in recognizing it. They regarded
that act as scarcely less hostile than would have been the formal
recognition of the Southern Confederacy as an independent nation.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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