The History of the Confederate War, Its Causes and Its Conduct, Volume 1 (of 2): A Narrative and Critical HistoryEggleston, George Cary
History
The History of the Confederate War, Its Causes and Its Conduct, Volume 1 (of 2): A Narrative and Critical History
Eggleston, George Cary
United States -- History -- Civil War, 1861-1865
The Confederates made their assault with great impetuosity at dawn
of April 6. The first that Sherman, who held the advance of Grant's
position, knew of the impending battle was when the Confederates forty
thousand strong rushed upon his camps and after a brief but stubborn
struggle carried them, Sherman being driven back so hurriedly that he
left his tents standing and the breakfasts of his men not yet cooked.
The first that Grant knew of a tremendous attack of which he had had
"scarcely the faintest idea," was when at his headquarters at Savannah
several miles down the river he heard the guns at work at Shiloh.
There has been much and angry discussion of the question whether or
not Grant and Sherman were "surprised," in the military acceptation
of the term, by the Confederate onslaught at Shiloh. The point has
little historical importance, but in the light of all the facts since
disclosed by the records it is difficult to interpret what happened
there otherwise than as a complete surprise, which but for the
excellent discipline of the Federal troops and their superb fighting
quality might easily have ended in disaster. We have seen that Halleck
in St. Louis did not intend to leave for the front, where he expected
to command in person, until the next day or even later. We have seen
how confident Grant was in his belief that the Confederates intended no
general attack either then or later and how he planned himself to take
the offensive. It is certain that Grant's forces were not disposed as
they would have been if an assault by the enemy had been anticipated.
The several advance corps were posted with little or no reference to
coöperation between them to resist an enemy assaulting in force. No
line of battle had been formed or in any way provided for. Sherman,
who was first assailed, was resting quietly in camps which would very
certainly have been stripped for action if an attack had been expected.
Indeed, Sherman's very latest reports to Grant had expressed the
utmost confidence that no attack was in contemplation, and that the
Confederates would do nothing more than annoy the pickets. He reported
to Grant that they "will not press our pickets far." In brief it is
obvious that neither Halleck at St. Louis, nor Grant at Savannah,
Tennessee, nor Sherman, holding the front at Shiloh meeting house,
anticipated a battle in front of Pittsburg Landing. They expected to
fight on the offensive at Corinth when they should be ready to advance,
but the thought of having to defend themselves against a Confederate
force assailing them at Shiloh seems never to have occurred to them
until the Confederates fell upon Sherman's camp with their "yell," for
a first warning of their presence.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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