The History of the Confederate War, Its Causes and Its Conduct, Volume 1 (of 2): A Narrative and Critical HistoryEggleston, George Cary
History
The History of the Confederate War, Its Causes and Its Conduct, Volume 1 (of 2): A Narrative and Critical History
Eggleston, George Cary
United States -- History -- Civil War, 1861-1865
This occurred on the second day of the Shiloh battle, April 7, 1862,
on which day, after a heroic effort to breast Grant's overwhelming
numbers, Beauregard withdrew from Shiloh to Corinth. This capture of
Island Number 10 opened the Mississippi to Memphis, except for the
single and, as it afterwards proved to be, the utterly ineffective
position at Fort Pillow.
General Halleck was fully informed of all that had happened. He knew
that Pope's way was open down the Mississippi to Memphis, and that
Memphis, scarcely at all defended, was within his easy grasp. He knew
of course that Memphis was the westerly end of the new defensive line
of the Confederates, and that its capture must compel them still
further to retire toward the south, even should he fail or neglect to
drive them from the Memphis and Charleston railroad line at Corinth, as
he easily might have done with his utterly overwhelming force, and as
Grant would undoubtedly have done if that vigorously aggressive general
had been left in control of that splendidly equipped army. But Halleck
sat still and pottered over "reports" that annoyingly paid no tribute
to his genius and suggested no credit to him for the victory that had
been won.
Meanwhile Grant was losing time. The Confederates, foreseeing the
inevitable loss of Memphis, which happened on the sixth of June,
nearly two months after energy would easily have compelled it, were
busily fortifying all defensible positions on the river below,
especially at Vicksburg and Port Hudson, and thus making necessary
one of the most strenuous and one of the bloodiest campaigns of the
war, where scarcely any campaign at all would have been necessary but
for the fact that a martinet officer, much too "scientific" and too
"regular" for the practical purposes of war, was in authority over a
man who knew not only how to plan campaigns but how to conduct them
quickly to a successful conclusion.
CHAPTER XXV
FARRAGUT AT NEW ORLEANS
There was still another man of splendid genius and capacity who about
this time came to the front as a winner of victories for the Federal
arms, and above all, as a man like Grant, who knew how to do things
when officialism permitted him to act. Like Grant on the one side, and
Lee on the other, Farragut was at first treated as a negligible factor
in the war.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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