The History of the Confederate War, Its Causes and Its Conduct, Volume 1 (of 2): A Narrative and Critical HistoryEggleston, George Cary
History
The History of the Confederate War, Its Causes and Its Conduct, Volume 1 (of 2): A Narrative and Critical History
Eggleston, George Cary
United States -- History -- Civil War, 1861-1865
The city lies about a hundred miles, to use round figures, above the
multitudinous mouths of the Mississippi. It lies less than half a dozen
miles west of the so-called Lake Pontchartrain, which is an inlet from
the gulf, with two other bodies of water, Mississippi Sound and Lake
Borgne, lying between.
But the passes into Lake Borgne and from that body of water into Lake
Pontchartrain, are shallow and difficult, as the British discovered in
1814 in their attempt to approach New Orleans by the "back door," as it
were.
On the other hand, the Mississippi has five principal mouths, with some
others that carry less water. Thus it was, or seemed to be, impossible
for any Federal fleet to blockade the entrances to that stream and cut
off commerce between New Orleans and the outer world.
But above and beyond all these considerations, was the desire of the
Federal authorities to conquer control of the Mississippi itself
throughout its entire length. That would be not only to split the
Confederacy into halves, cutting off a large part of its food
resources, but also to make of the great river a convenient highway for
the transportation of Federal food supplies, troops, ammunition and all
else that is needful in war, to such points as might have need of them.
Thus the reduction of the defenses of New Orleans, and the conquest
of that city became a matter of supreme strategic importance. To this
task Farragut was assigned with a fleet that, in our time, could
not possibly force its way past a single well-defended fort, or
successfully meet an adversary afloat. He had in his fleet, first of
all--in Navy Department estimation--twenty-one schooners, each carrying
a mortar intended to throw shells high in air and drop them into the
Confederate defensive works. These proved to be utterly useless, as
Farragut had from the beginning believed that they would be. He had
besides, six sloops of war, sixteen gunboats, and eight other ships.
His flagship, the _Hartford_, was a wooden vessel, carrying twenty-two
Dahlgren nine-inch guns besides howitzers in the tops. The others were
similarly armed. All were under-powered, and could make only eight
knots an hour where there was no current. In such a stream as the
Mississippi four knots constituted the limit of their performance.
There were transports also, carrying an army of about 15,000 men
under command of General Benjamin F. Butler. This force was intended
to occupy the city after Farragut should have captured it, but until
he should do so it was only an incumbrance to his expedition. He got
rid of it for a time by landing the troops on one of the islands that
separate Mississippi Sound from the gulf, and leaving them there until
such time as he should have need of them.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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