The History of the Confederate War, Its Causes and Its Conduct, Volume 1 (of 2): A Narrative and Critical HistoryEggleston, George Cary
History
The History of the Confederate War, Its Causes and Its Conduct, Volume 1 (of 2): A Narrative and Critical History
Eggleston, George Cary
United States -- History -- Civil War, 1861-1865
A wise prophet, basing his prophecies upon the patent facts of the
situation, could not have failed to foretell the outcome of such a war
with precision and certainty. The utmost that the South could do--even
by "robbing the cradle and the grave" as was wittily and sadly said
at the time, was to put 600,000 men into the field, first and last.
The North was able to enlist an aggregate of 2,778,304, or, if we
reduce this to a basis of three years' service for each man, the Union
enlistments for three full years numbered no less than 2,326,168--or
nearly four times the total enlistments in the Confederate army from
beginning to end of the war. Yet the Confederate armies included
practically every white man in the South who was able to bear arms.
There was in effect a levy _en masse_, including the entire white male
population from early boyhood to extreme old age.
Again the Federal Government had a navy and the Confederates none.
It was certain from the beginning that the Federal authorities would
completely shut the South in by blockading and closely sealing every
southern port. Thus the Federals--as was apparent in advance--were
destined to have the whole world to draw upon for soldiers, for
supplies, for ammunition, for improved arms and for everything else
that contributes to military strength, while the South must rely
absolutely upon itself--ill armed, and unequipped with anything except
courage, devotion and heroic fortitude.
There were no facilities at the South for the manufacture of arms.
There was not an armory in all that land that could turn out a musket
of the pattern then in use, not a machine shop that could convert a
muzzle-loading rifle into a breech-loader or give to any gun so much
as a choke bore. There were foundries that could cast iron cannon of
an antique pattern, but not one that could make a modern gun. There
were machine shops--a very few--in which the Northern-made locomotives
then in use on Southern railroads could be repaired in a small way,
but there was not in all the South a shop in which a useful locomotive
could be built. Nor were there any car builders who had had experience
in the making of rolling stock fit for service.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account