The History of the Confederate War, Its Causes and Its Conduct, Volume 2 (of 2): A Narrative and Critical HistoryEggleston, George Cary
History
The History of the Confederate War, Its Causes and Its Conduct, Volume 2 (of 2): A Narrative and Critical History
Eggleston, George Cary
United States -- History -- Civil War, 1861-1865
This was the most staggering blow that Grant had ever received in
battle, and the news of it appalled the authorities at Washington, and
greatly depressed the people throughout the North. That a little army
like Lee's, reduced by this time to less than 50,000 men, should have
inflicted such a defeat upon an adversary whose forces were generally
estimated at 120,000 men seemed to those persons who do not understand
the conditions of battle to indicate a lack either of commanding
capacity on the part of General Grant or of fighting capacity on the
part of the army under his command.
Both of these judgments were clearly mistaken. It was perhaps an
error on General Grant's part to assail Lee in his strong position
at Cold Harbor, but it was a mistake prompted by that boldness which
so often achieves conspicuous results in war. In criticizing such
operations it is always necessary to bear in mind that "war is a
hazard of possibilities, probabilities, luck and ill luck." At Cold
Harbor there was, to say the least, a possibility that Grant, with his
overwhelmingly superior numbers, might break through the Confederate
lines, and force his way into Richmond. There was the hazard of such
failure as that which the Federal army in fact met with. For the sake
of the possibility Grant accepted the hazard. Had he won there would
have been nothing but praise throughout the North for a boldness
which had achieved so conspicuous a success. As he lost in the hazard
instead, there was bitter criticism which has not ceased even unto this
day.
Fortunately for the Federal cause, the administration at Washington
had at last learned that uniform, continued, and complete success
is a thing not to be expected of any commander in the field. The
administration, therefore, did not withdraw its confidence from Grant
or put some other in his place because Lee had thus far baffled him
in his endeavors, or because in this instance he had met with bloody
defeat at Lee's hands. As for Grant himself, he was always a man of
calm mind in no way given to hysterical exaltations on the one hand, or
morbid depressions of spirit on the other. He accepted his defeat at
Cold Harbor as a mere incident in a campaign which he was determined to
carry on to the end in the best way he could.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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