The History of the Confederate War, Its Causes and Its Conduct, Volume 2 (of 2): A Narrative and Critical HistoryEggleston, George Cary
History
The History of the Confederate War, Its Causes and Its Conduct, Volume 2 (of 2): A Narrative and Critical History
Eggleston, George Cary
United States -- History -- Civil War, 1861-1865
Thus defeated in his attempt to push his way to Atlanta, while holding
on to his communications in rear, Sherman now determined upon a
desperate move which violated all the traditions of war and all the
teachings of the books on strategy, but which both Lee and Grant had
boldly adopted and with success, on other and most notable occasions.
Loading his wagons with ten days' supplies of food and ammunition he
decided to abandon his communications altogether, move independently
of them, and trust to the fortunes of war for a success which might
justify the daring of his endeavor. He had tried and failed to force
Johnston back to Atlanta. He now determined to maneuver him into such
retreat and in the course of his maneuvering boldly to take the risk of
the destruction or the capture of his own army.
His plan was to swing his entire army--foot loose from its
communications--around Johnston's flank, and to strike the railroad in
the Confederate general's rear, between Marietta and Atlanta. If he
could succeed in doing this, he would easily compel Johnston to make
a hasty retreat upon the defenses of Atlanta. But should he fail in
doing it he would have on his hands an army in the field, destitute
alike of provisions and ammunition so soon at least, as the supplies it
carried with it should be consumed. In that event he must surrender to
a foe vastly inferior to himself in numbers, for no army can long live
without food and no army can fight after its ammunition is expended.
Thus Sherman undertook to accomplish certain great military operations
within ten days' time, with the certainty present to his mind that
should he fail he must fail disastrously, sacrifice all the achievement
which he had set out to gain, and possibly even surrender an army that
outnumbered its adversary far more than two to one.
Following the same plan which Grant was following in Virginia but by
reverse process, Sherman on the night of July second made a movement by
his right flank southward, withdrawing first the troops on his left,
and passing them to the right, in rear of troops still holding the
lines.
Johnston was quick to penetrate Sherman's purpose, and by way of
defeating it he promptly abandoned his position, and fell back to the
Chattahoochee river, which closely flanks Atlanta on the northwest.
Sherman had hoped that Johnston would attempt the immediate crossing of
that stream, and he therefore hurried forward his strongest divisions,
in the hope of catching his enemy in the act, and assailing him at a
disadvantage. But Johnston was too wily for that. He had prepared for
himself in advance a line of fortifications along the Chattahoochee,
which Sherman has described as one of the strongest pieces of field
fortifications he ever saw.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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