The History of the Confederate War, Its Causes and Its Conduct, Volume 2 (of 2): A Narrative and Critical HistoryEggleston, George Cary
History
The History of the Confederate War, Its Causes and Its Conduct, Volume 2 (of 2): A Narrative and Critical History
Eggleston, George Cary
United States -- History -- Civil War, 1861-1865
General Grant was a man of skill and genius in the game of war. But
until the summer of 1864 he had never played that game against another
great master of it. He had baffled and beaten Albert Sydney Johnston,
whose reputation as a commander of great skill rests rather upon the
anticipation of his comrades in the old army at the outbreak of the
war, than upon any demonstration of such skill made by himself. Grant
had held his own and more against Beauregard in the tremendous second
day's struggle at Shiloh. He had overcome great natural obstacles in
his effort to take Vicksburg and he had received there the surrender
of Pemberton,--a general who had never before commanded an army in the
field, or in any other way manifested a capacity for command. Grant
had also met Bragg at Chattanooga and beaten him. But none of these
antagonists had been comparable with Lee as a great master of strategy
and command.
When Grant found himself defeated at Cold Harbor, as he has himself
described his situation, he had been baffled in both the purposes
with which he had undertaken his campaign. He had not crushed Lee's
army, nor had he succeeded in cutting it off from its base in the
fortifications of Richmond. He had said at Spottsylvania that he would
"fight it out on this line if it takes all summer." The summer was
still young when he found himself at Cold Harbor unable to do further
fighting upon that line. He had crippled his enemy, it is true, but he
had lost more than three men to that enemy's one, and that enemy still
lay between him and Richmond in a mood of resoluteness and defiance.
There was no way open to him by which, with any show of sanity, to
assail Lee further in the field. It was then that he decided upon a
campaign on other lines than those which he had chosen at the beginning
of the summer.
He hoped by his movement upon Petersburg to take Lee at last by
surprise, to cut his communications, and compel his precipitate retreat
from the Confederate capital. Here again he was baffled of his purpose.
There remained to him only the resource of dogged determination. He
called for reinforcements in order that his army might always outnumber
that of his adversary by two or three to one, and thus equipped with
superior force, he determined, by continually extending his lines to
the south and west, to draw Lee's slender line of defense into the
condition of an attenuated thread.
Let us make this military situation clear to the minds of unmilitary
readers. Grant lay east of Richmond and Petersburg, with a secure
base of supplies at City Point on the James river, just in his rear.
That base was perfectly protected by a great war fleet which lay in
the river and held it. It was easily accessible from the North by
transports of every kind, bringing troops or supplies of food or
ammunition. Grant's rear was as secure and as well furnished as if it
had rested upon New York harbor.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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