The History of the Confederate War, Its Causes and Its Conduct, Volume 2 (of 2): A Narrative and Critical HistoryEggleston, George Cary
History
The History of the Confederate War, Its Causes and Its Conduct, Volume 2 (of 2): A Narrative and Critical History
Eggleston, George Cary
United States -- History -- Civil War, 1861-1865
It was not until after midday that these preparations and others of
a like kind were completed. But in the meanwhile detachments from
Lamkin's battery of mortars were pushed up and placed behind traverses
within sixty yards of that cavernous hole in which thousands of Federal
soldiers were lying helpless for lack of a leader fit to command them.
These mortars continued ceaselessly throughout the morning to hurl
twenty-four-pound shells into the hole at the rate of twenty a minute.
This fire was murderous in an extreme degree, but there was no escape
from it. The men subjected to it had no choice but to sit still and
await the end. They could neither advance nor retreat with any hope of
escape in either direction.
Finally a little after midday, and after he had completed his
preparations and the placing of his guns, Lee ordered Mahone, with a
heavy infantry force, to charge across the field to the very edge of
the crater, and pour into it a fire so destructive that its further
tenancy should be rendered impossible. The more desperate of the
Federal troops in the hole risked flight toward their own lines, fifty
yards away. Not many of them succeeded in getting there. The rest
surrendered, and the Confederates occupied the crater.
The narrow space between the two lines was literally piled high with
dead Federal soldiers, lying on top of each other, sometimes three
deep, and in some places five. A day later there was a suspension of
hostilities for a few hours, and the dead were dragged away and buried.
This badly managed affair well nigh rivaled the blunder at Cold Harbor
in its costliness to the Army of the Potomac. Grant's loss was more
than 4,000 men,--Lee's less than 1,000.
The whole enterprise was of doubtful military propriety. Yet if it had
been conducted with an energy and capability equal to that which had
been brought to bear upon other fields it might have promised the
early and complete destruction of Lee's defenses. If there had been,
in command of the troops set apart for the assault, such a man as
Sheridan, for example, or Hooker, or Hancock, the chance was an even
one or better that the force hurled suddenly upon Lee's broken line
could have made its way into Petersburg by impetuous advance. It must
be accounted one of General Meade's rare failures in judgment, that he
did not place the assailing force under some such commander upon whom
he could depend to give wise personal direction and leadership to the
desperate fighting needed on such an occasion.
In its outcome, this enterprise which had been planned for
the destruction of Lee and his army, resulted rather in their
strengthening. Having recaptured the crater they promptly threw up a
line of works along that side of it which lay nearest to their enemy,
thus in fact, shortening the distance between the two lines, without in
any way weakening their position.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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