The History of the Confederate War, Its Causes and Its Conduct, Volume 2 (of 2): A Narrative and Critical HistoryEggleston, George Cary
History
The History of the Confederate War, Its Causes and Its Conduct, Volume 2 (of 2): A Narrative and Critical History
Eggleston, George Cary
United States -- History -- Civil War, 1861-1865
Lee, on the other hand had good reason to be satisfied with the results
of his work. With one man to his enemy's three he had so brilliantly
maneuvered as to strike his foe at each point with a superior force; he
had, by virtue of superior genius alone inflicted disaster upon an army
vastly greater than his own in numbers, and possessed of commanding
strategic positions; he had beaten that army in a succession of
battles, and driven it into hurried and uncertain retreat; he had saved
Richmond and again made himself master of the military situation.
His army needed rest after its arduous work, and to give it rest he lay
still for some weeks.
But in the meanwhile he did not lose sight of that supreme purpose
which had inspired him from the beginning of his career as the
commander of the Army of Northern Virginia. That purpose was to
transfer the seat of war northward, to press the enemy, to protect
Richmond by putting Washington on its defense.
There were special reasons for the adoption of this policy now.
Operations at the West had been disastrous and discouraging to the
Confederates. Their armies had been driven out of Kentucky and
Tennessee. The fall of Island Number Ten and Memphis a little later in
the northern reaches of the Mississippi and Farragut's capture of New
Orleans at its southern end had left the Southerners only a small hold
upon the great river at Vicksburg, Port Hudson and the space between.
Grant was insistently hammering at Vicksburg, with every prospect
of soon capturing that key to the river and completely cutting the
Confederacy in twain. But if Lee could capture Washington or compel
its evacuation by pushing himself into its rear and perhaps seizing
upon Baltimore, Philadelphia and New York, the disasters at the West
would count for nothing in the reckoning. Europe at least would accept
the successful invasion of the North and the conquest of its capital
as events decisive of the war in behalf of the South; and European
intervention was still the one thing most dreaded at the North and most
ardently hoped for at the South.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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