Animadv. in Athen. x. 15. Cf. Scaliger, Poet. iii. 84, where the distinction made by Pollux is explained. Footnote 857: Chap. xiv. vv. 14. 18. Chytræus, in his note on this passage, has several excellent and learned remarks on the subject. Vid. Seber. ad Poll. t. v. p. 141. ----- To which they, being instructed by his wife, replied: “What is sweeter than honey? and what is stronger than a lion?” The word griphos, in its original acceptation, signified a fishing-net, and hence by translation was employed to describe a captious or cunningly contrived question, in which the wits of people were entangled.[858] As the ancients delighted in this sort of intellectual trifling they were at the pains to be very methodical about it, dividing the riddle into several kinds, which Clearchos of Soli[859] made the subject of a separate work. This writer, a sort of Greek D’Israeli, defines the griphos to mean “a sportive problem proposed for solution on condition, that the discovery of the sense should be attended by a reward, and failure with punishment.” His description of the seven classes could scarcely be rendered intelligible, and certainly not interesting to the modern reader. It will be more to the purpose to introduce two or three specimens, prefacing them by a few remarks. ----- Footnote 858: Pollux. vi. 108. Scalig. Poet. iii. 84. Footnote 859: Schol. Aristoph. Vesp. 20. Athen. x. 69. ----- It has been above observed, that philosophical truths were often wrapped up in these sportive problems, which purposely obscured, so as to afford but dim and distant glimpses of the forms within, necessarily exercised and sharpened the wit and induced keen and persevering habits of investigation. The reward also and the penalty had the same tendency. A crown, an extra junket, and the applause of the company, cheered the successful Œdipos, while the lackwit who beat about the bush without catching the owl, had to make wry faces over a cup of brine or pickle. Theodectes, the sophist, a man distinguished for the excellence of his memory, obtained reputation as a riddle-solver, and denominated such questions the “springs of memory.”[860] But whatever the interrogatories themselves may have been, the reward, to which their solution often led, was rather a source of forgetfulness, consisting of a goblet of wine which, when no interpreter could be found, passed to the propounder.[861] ----- Footnote 860: Pollux. vi. 108. Footnote 861: Etym. Mag. 341, 35, sqq. Suidas. v. γρῖφος, t. i. p. 628, seq. ----- The riddle was of course a mine of wealth to the comic poets, who could not be supposed to forego the use of so admirable a contrivance to raise expectation and beget surprise. But it is clear, from the examples still preserved, that they oftener missed than hit. Antiphanes’s griphoi on “bringing and not bringing;” on the “porridge-pot;” on a “tart,” &c., are poor things; but the following from the “Dream” of Alexis is good: