The history of the rise, progress, and establishment of the independence of the United States of America, Vol. 2 (of 3) : $b Including an account of the late war, and of the thirteen colonies, from their origin to that periodGordon, William
History
The history of the rise, progress, and establishment of the independence of the United States of America, Vol. 2 (of 3) : $b Including an account of the late war, and of the thirteen colonies, from their origin to that period
Gordon, William
United States -- History -- Colonial period, ca. 1600-1775; United States -- History -- Revolution, 1775-1783
Gen. Greene is sent out with a considerable detachment to support a
party stationed about a mile off, and to check the march of the enemy;
but finds them advancing in such force and so expeditiously, that he is
at some difficulty in making a good retreat with the whole of the
Americans. Mean while general Washington makes a disposition for an
action; which, as the enemy do not come on directly, is afterward varied
to prevent their getting in on the American rear. The bridge over
Sanpink Creek, is well secured; but can be of little advantage, as the
stream is fordable in many places. The American army has between thirty
and forty pieces of artillery in front, facing the creek. The fate of
the continent seems suspended by a single thread; and the independence
of America to hang on the issue of a battle which appears inevitable;
and in which the most sanguine son of liberty can scarce flatter himself
with the hope of a victory, the enemy being so superior in numbers and
discipline. A defeat must be totally ruinous, from the nature of the
ground which the Americans occupy.
Sir William Erskine, according to report, advises lord Cornwallis to an
immediate attack, saying, “Otherwise Washington, if any general, will
make a move to the left of your army: if your lordship does not attack,
throw a large body of troops on the road to your left.” The attack is
put off till the morning; his lordship might act upon what is said to be
a military principle, that the strongest army ought not to attack toward
night. Mean while gen. Washington calls a council of war. It is known
that they are to be attacked the next day, by the whole collected force
of the enemy. The matter of debate is, “Shall we march down on the
Jersey side, and cross the Delaware over against Philadelphia, or shall
we fight?” Both are thought to be too hazardous. On this gen. Washington
says, “What think you of a circuitous march to Princeton?” It is
approved, and concluded upon. Providence favors the manœuvre. The
weather having been for two days warm, moist and foggy, the ground is
become quite soft, and the roads to be passed so deep that it will be
extremely difficult, if practicable, to get on with the cattle,
carriages and artillery. But while the council is sitting, the wind
suddenly changes to the north-west, and it freezes so hard that by the
time the troops are ready to move, they pass on as though upon a solid
pavement. Such freezings frequently happen in the depth of winter, upon
the wind’s coming suddenly about to the north-west. This sudden change
of weather gives a plausible pretext for that line of fires which gen.
Washington causes to be kindled soon after dark, in the front of his
army; and by which he conceals himself from the notice of the enemy, and
induces them to believe he is still upon the ground, waiting for them
till morning. The stratagem is rendered the more complete by an order
given to the men who are entrusted with the business, to keep up the
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