Sir William Howe, while off the Capes, received that information which led him to judge it most advisable to proceed to Chesapeake-Bay instead of going up the Delaware. Such information could not relate to the measures taken for rendering the navigation of the river impracticable. These measures were matters of so great notoriety, that he must have been strangely deficient in procuring intelligence, if he did not know them before he left the Hook. Beside, the obstructions in the river did not reach so low down as either Newcasle or Wilmington; as high as either of which places the fleet might have come with safety; and had he landed at the first of them, he would have been within 36 miles of Philadelphia, and fourteen miles nearer than the Head of Elk. The information most probably related to gen. Washington’s having marched the continental army within a certain distance of Philadelphia; and perhaps, to a prospect of his being joined by a number of disaffected Americans in the states of Maryland and Delaware, upon his going up the Chesapeak and landing in Maryland. Be that as it may, through unfavourable winds he did not enter the Chesapeak till the 16th of August; and the difficulty of the navigation made it the 25th, before the army landed at Elk ferry. One part advanced to the Head of Elk, the other continued at the landing place to protect and forward the artillery, stores and necessary provisions. The day Sir William entered the Chesapeak, he received from lord George Germain, a letter of May the 18th, wherein was given him the first intimation, that any support whatever would be expected from him in favor of the northern expedition under gen. Burgoyne, in words to this purpose—“I trust that whatever you may meditate, it will be executed in time to co-operate with the army ordered to proceed from Canada.” Gen. Washington upon advice of the British army’s having landed, marched toward the Brandywine river, with his troops, amounting in the whole to 11,000 present and fit for duty, including 1800 of the Pennsylvania militia. Gen. Greene attended with gen. Weedon, was sent to reconnoitre and find out an eligible spot for their encampment. He pitched upon one at the Cross Roads, near six miles distant from the royal army, which he judged suitable, as the Americans would there have an open country behind them, from whence they could draw assistance, and would have opportunities of skirmishing with the enemy before they were organized and provided with teams and horses, &c. for marching; and as Howe’s troops would be a long while cramped before they could get what was wanting in order to their proceeding. He wrote to the commander in chief, acquainting him with the spot he had chosen. But the information was received too late: a council of war had determined the same day it was transmitted, to take a position upon Red-Clay Neck, about half way between Wilmington and Christianna, alias