The history of the rise, progress, and establishment of the independence of the United States of America, Vol. 2 (of 3) : $b Including an account of the late war, and of the thirteen colonies, from their origin to that periodGordon, William
History
The history of the rise, progress, and establishment of the independence of the United States of America, Vol. 2 (of 3) : $b Including an account of the late war, and of the thirteen colonies, from their origin to that period
Gordon, William
United States -- History -- Colonial period, ca. 1600-1775; United States -- History -- Revolution, 1775-1783
doing any thing that might prove inconsistent with his own honor;
however, if it was thought best that he should march immediately to the
camp, he would acquiesce. On the 13th he wrote, that he should throw
away all private resentment when put in balance with the good of his
country. Gen. Washington did not approve of Scuyler’s apparent intention
of uniting all the militia and continental troops in one body, and of
making an opposition wholly in front. He was of opinion, that a
sufficient body of militia should alway be reserved to fall upon
Burgoyne’s flanks or rear, and to intercept his convoys. Stark however
had concluded, on the day last mentioned, upon marching from Bennington
to meet Lincoln at a certain appointed place, and to proceed with him
and join Scuyler; but while writing to the former, he received
information that the enemy were on their march to Cambridge.
Gen. Burgoyne’s progress toward Albany was delayed through the want of a
speedy and sufficient supply of provisions. He considered in what way
the difficulty was to be surmounted. According to information, the
Americans had a great deposit of corn, flour and store cattle at
Bennington, which was guarded only by militia. Every day’s account
confirmed the persuasion of the loyalty of one description of the
inhabitants in that part of the country, and of the panic of the other.
He therefore entertained the design of surprising the stores at
Bennington, and of sending a very large detachment upon the expedition;
but was diverted from the latter (as supposed) by major Skeen, who
assured him, “The friends to the British cause are as five to one, and
they want only the appearance of a protecting power, to show
themselves.” Relying upon their attachment, the gen. sent the German
lieut. col. Baum, with only about 500 men and 100 Indians, who carried
with them two light pieces of artillery. To facilitate the operation,
the army moved along the east shore of Hudson’s-River, and encamped
nearly opposite to Saratoga; and a bridge of rafts being thrown over,
the advance corps passed to that place. Lieut. col. Breymen’s corps,
consisting of the Brunswick grenadiers, light-infanty and chasseurs,
were posted at Batten-kill, in order, if necessary, to support Baum.
Stark hearing that a party of Indians was at Cambridge, sent lieut. col.
Gregg, with 200 men to stop their progress. Toward night he was informed
by express, that there was a large body of regulars in the rear of the
Indians. On that he drew together his brigade and the militia who were
at hand, in order to stop their march; sent to Manchester for col.
Warner’s regiment, and forwarded expresses to the neighbouring militia
to join him with all speed. He then marched, in the morning of the 14th,
with colonels Warner, Williams and Brush, and the men present, and in
about seven miles met Gregg retreating, and the enemy within a mile of
him. The troops drew up in order of battle; and the enemy, upon coming
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