The history of the rise, progress, and establishment of the independence of the United States of America, Vol. 2 (of 3) : $b Including an account of the late war, and of the thirteen colonies, from their origin to that periodGordon, William
History
The history of the rise, progress, and establishment of the independence of the United States of America, Vol. 2 (of 3) : $b Including an account of the late war, and of the thirteen colonies, from their origin to that period
Gordon, William
United States -- History -- Colonial period, ca. 1600-1775; United States -- History -- Revolution, 1775-1783
It may be thought by many, that if general Howe, instead of commencing
his operations on Long-Island, had run up the _North-River_, and landed
above _New-York_, he would either have compelled gen. Washington to a
sudden evacuation of the city, with the loss of nearly all the stores of
the army; or to have fought, though very unequal in numbers and troops;
or to have surrendered for want of provision. That such a movement might
have been made, wind and tide favoring, without any particular danger of
a failure, had been established by the safe passage of the Phœnix and
Rose up and down the river.
The victorious army encamped in front of the American works in the
evening; and on the 28th at night, broke ground in form, about 4 or 500
yards distant from a redoubt which covered the left of the Americans.
The same day gen. _Mifflin_ crossed over from New-York with 1000 men; at
night he made an offer to gen. _Washington_ of going the rounds, which
was accepted. He observed the approaches of the enemy, and the
forwardness of their batteries; and was convinced that no time was to be
lost. The next morning [Aug. 29.] he conversed with the general upon the
subject, and said, “You must either fight or retreat immediately. What
is your strength?” The general answered, “nine thousand.” The other
replied, “It is not sufficient, we must therefore retreat.” They were
both agreed as to the calling of a council of war; and gen. Mifflin was
to propose a retreat. But as he was to make that proposal, lest his own
character should suffer, he stipulated, that if a retreat should be
agreed upon, he would command the rear; and if an action, the van. When
the council was held, these reasons, among others, were mentioned for
removing the army to New-York, viz.—“The heavy rains which have fallen
two days and nights, with but little intermission, have injured the arms
and spoiled a great part of the ammunition, and the soldiers, being
without cover and obliged to lie in their lines, are worn out.”——“From
the time the enemy moved from Flatbush, several large ships have
attempted to get up, as supposed, into the East-River, to cut off our
communication, by which the whole army would be destroyed, but the wind
being north-east, they have not been able to effect it.”——“The troops
are become dispirited by their incessant duty and watching.” It was
unanimously agreed to quit. Col. Glover, who belonged to Marblehead, was
called upon with the whole of his regiment fit for duty, to take the
command of the vessels and flat-bottomed boats. Most of the men were
formerly employed in the fishery, and so peculiarly well qualified for
the service.—The colonel went over himself from New-York, to give
directions; and about seven o’clock at night, officers and men went to
work with a spirit and resolution peculiar to that corps. The
embarkation of the troops was committed to gen. M’Dougall. He was upon
the spot at Brooklye ferry, at eight o’clock, the hour fixed for the
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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